

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 14 October, 1943 - File No. 12

(10)

**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]**

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	reports	Spot Reports	10/17/73	B
2	brief	President's Thursday Briefing	10/17/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE		BOX NUMBER		
NSC		1174		
FOLDER TITLE		RESTRICTION CODES		
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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SECRET (GDS)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET (GDS)

October 17, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT  
SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President's  
Cabinet Meeting on October 18 --  
Middle East

Attached you will find a copy of talking points on the Middle East for the President to use at the Cabinet meeting tomorrow.

Recommendation: That you approve the talking points for the President.

SECRET

TALKING POINTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. Prior to the outbreak of war on October 6, we made serious efforts in the short time available to stop it. When this failed, we sought to achieve a ceasefire that would make it possible to move forward to an overall peace settlement.
2. When it became clear that the fighting might be prolonged and the Soviets began a massive resupply effort, we made a basic decision not to let the military balance shift against Israel. This past weekend we began a large-scale resupply effort to Israel.
3. In meeting with the Arab foreign ministers yesterday, I made the point that we favor a ceasefire and movement toward a peace settlement based on UN Resolution 242.
4. Arab reaction to our resupply effort has been restrained. They do not seem to want a confrontation with us.
5. We intend to pursue a two-track policy: first, we will continue to resupply Israel so that the military balance does not shift; second, we will continue a serious diplomatic effort to end the fighting and to move toward a settlement of the Arab/Israeli problem.
6. I have made it clear to the Arabs that for the United States to play an effective role it must retain its close ties to Israel.
7. We have also made it clear that if the Soviets stop their supply of arms to the Arabs, we will halt our resupply effort.
8. We hope to see serious diplomatic progress in the next few days.

## MEMORANDUM

4-16

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 17, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: LES JANKA  
FROM: BILL QUANDT 32.  
SUBJECT: Press Guidance on President's Meeting  
with Four Arab Foreign Ministers

The President met this morning with the Foreign Ministers of four Arab states--Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Algeria. The meeting lasted for                   hour and                   minutes, from                   a.m. to                   a.m.. The meeting was held at the request of the four Foreign Ministers. They discussed with the President the present Middle East crisis and conveyed their views. The President emphasized that the United States is strongly interested in a peace settlement in the Middle East. He explained the importance of achieving an end to hostilities in such a way that movement toward a just and durable peace can be achieved.

\* \* \*

Question: Did the Arab Foreign Ministers protest US arms supplies to Israel?

Answer: They made their views known on the subject. The President explained our policy. I have no further comment.

\* \* \*

Question: Did the issue of the President's comments on October 15, militarily, which have been interpreted as a threat to intervene/in the Middle East, come up?

Answer: We have made it clear that those remarks should not be interpreted as meaning the US will intervene in the Middle East. The President stressed that our objective is peace, not the continuation of hostilities.

\* \* \*

Question: Did the Arab Foreign Ministers threaten to cut off oil production if the United States continues to aid Israel?

Answer: No threats were made in this meeting. The President and the Arab Foreign Ministers had a serious discussion of the present crisis in the Middle East. I have nothing more to add on the substance of these talks.

\* \* \*

Question: Does the President's willingness to see the Arab Foreign Ministers mean that he is trying to appear even-handed in this conflict?

Answer: The President has said that we are neither pro-Israel nor pro-Arab--we are pro-peace.

\* \* \*



Department of State *W.H.*  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

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FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2170  
BT  
SECRET USNATO 4949

174632Z OCT 73  
17 OCT 73 211 51

NODIS *more NATO discussion* *m.e.*  
E.C. 11652: XGDS1  
TAGS: PFOR, NATO  
SUBJECT: PERMREP'S LUNCH DISCUSSION ON MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

SUMMARY: AT LUNCH OCTOBER 16, PERMREPS CONTINUED USEFUL DISCUSSION BEGUN AT COUNCIL EARLIER THAT DAY OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION IN ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS. DE STAERCKE AND ESPECIALLY LUNS WERE HELPFUL IN HIGHLIGHTING KEY POINTS ABOUT U.S. AIMS SET FORTH IN MY COUNCIL STATEMENT. AMEASSADORS' QUESTIONS INDICATED DESIRE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM U.S. IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

1. AT PERMREP LUNCH OCTOBER 16, BELGIAN AMEASSADOR DE STAERCKE NOTED I HAD NOT MENTIONED MBFR WHEN I SUGGESTED IN COUNCIL THAT MORNING THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO OUR POLICY REGARDING CSCE IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WOULD PUBLIC OPINION SEE SOME PARADOX IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AT A TIME OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

2. I RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT RECOMMENDING A SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION AS TO CSCE, BUT RATHER WAS PUTTING THOUGHTS FORWARD FOR DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION, TO SEE WHAT THE ALLIANCE THOUGHT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THOSE AND OTHER ITEMS THAT MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD BY OTHER MEMBER GOVERNMENTS, OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I POINTED OUT THAT MY STATEMENT HAD NOT ESTABLISHED A US POSITION ON THOSE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION, BUT RATHER HAD SIMPLY INTRODUCED THEM FOR DISCUSSION, AND THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES. U.S. STATEMENTS BETWEEN THE EARLIER COMMENTS OF PRESIDENT NIXON AND DR. KISSINGER IN WASHINGTON WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND THE STATEMENTS I HAD MADE EARLIER TODAY. I NOTED THAT THE SITUATION HAD EVOLVED. THE MIDDLE EAST WAR WAS NOW ABOUT 10 DAYS OLD, AND THREE DAYS IN A 10 DAY OLD WAR WAS A LONG TIME. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE UNDERSTANDABLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE "PUBLIC" STATEMENTS REFERRED TO AND THE "PRIVATE" CONFIDENTIAL.



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

-2- USNATO 4949, OCT 17, NODIS

STATEMENT I HAD MADE TO THE ALLIES. THE U.S. LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING ASSESSMENTS, JUDGMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL.

4. SYG LUNS POINTED OUT THAT THE EARLIER KISSINGER STATEMENTS HAD HINTED AT THE WARNING THAT MY STATEMENT IN COUNCIL TODAY HAD CLEARLY INDICATED. DETENTE HAS SUFFERED; THE EXTENT WAS THE KEY QUESTION. HE HAD FOUND SATISFACTION IN MY STATEMENT, AND ASSUMED THE U.S. WILL DELIVER ARMS TO ISRAEL TO AVOID ITS DEFEAT BY THE ARABS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY HOW MUCH IN TERMS OF ARMS WOULD ACHIEVE THAT RESULT.

5. IN RESPONDING TO QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE U.S. WAS ASKING THE ALLIES TO CONCLUDE THAT DETENTE WAS FINISHED, I SAID NO, WE WERE ENGAGED IN THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES TO CONSIDER STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN AVOIDING AN EROSION OF DETENTE; HOW THE ALLIANCE AND THE ALLIES ACTED NOW COULD CONCEIVABLY AFFECT THE FUTURE OF DETENTE FOR ALL OF US.

6. DE STAERCKE NOTED THAT ISRAEL APPARENTLY LACKED THE MEANS TO COUNTERACT SOVIET-SUPPLIED WEAPONS, AND HE WONDERED IF NATO DID.

7. I RECALLED THAT AT THE JUNE DPC MINISTERIAL, SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD PARTICULARLY HIGHLIGHTED THE PROBLEM OF ARMOR. AT HIS INITIATIVE, THE DPC, EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP AND MILITARY COMMITTEE WERE STUDYING THIS PROBLEM AND WE WERE HOPEFUL OF PROGRESS. DEPUTY SYG PANSO SAID THAT JUST TODAY HE HAD CHAIRED AN EWG MEETING ON ARMOR AND TANKS, AND HE OBSERVED THAT A TANK IS NOT NECESSARILY THE BEST OR ONLY ANTI-TANK WEAPON.

8. FRENCH AMBASSADOR DE ROSE NOTED THAT THE U.S. IS ACTING UPON ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND ASKING NATO SOLIDARITY IN SUPPORT OF THOSE ACTIONS. IT WAS NORMAL FOR THE ALLIES TO INQUIRE WHAT UNDERLIES THE U.S. ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENT ACTIONS. HE WAS NOT ASKING THE U.S. TO SAY WHAT THE FUTURE WILL BRING, BUT RATHER WHAT THE U.S. THINKS THE FUTURE WILL LIKELY BE. OTHERS MADE POINT THAT THE ALLIES DO NOT HAVE SAME ACCESS TO INFORMATION THE U.S. DOES IN MAKING ITS ASSESSMENTS.



Department of State

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
-3- USNATO 4949, OCT 17, NODIS

9. I RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. WAS CONSULTING FULLY WITH ITS ALLIES IN THE COUNCIL ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT AS IT SHOULD. THE INITIATIVE MY GOVERNMENT ASKED ME TO TAKE THIS MORNING REFLCTED A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION TO DO SO. EVERY ALLY HAD CONTACTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOME ABILITY TO MAKE ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION. SIMILARILY, EVERY ALLY HAS CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND COULD MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. WE WANTED TO HEAR THEM.  
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WAR OCT 17

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, SA, KU, AG, MO  
SUBJ: MEMCON OF PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 17 MEETING WITH ARAB  
FOREIGN MINISTERS

*edited version  
of memocon*

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF  
PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 17 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTERS OF  
ALGERIA, KUWAIT, MOROCCO AND SAUDI ARABIA. COPIES OF WHICH  
WERE PROVIDED TO SAUDI, KUWAITI AND MORROCAN AMBASSADORS  
AND HEAD OF ALGERIAN INTERESTS SECTION HERE ON OCTOBER 20  
FOR TRANSMISSION TO RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS PER  
LATTER'S REQUEST. MEMCON OF SECRETARY'S MEETING BEING  
TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.

2. BEGIN TEXT. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF WEDNESDAY,  
OCTOBER 17, 1973, 11:10 A.M. IN THE PRESIDENT'S OVAL OFFICE.  
PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY KISSINGER, MINISTER  
OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OMAR SAQQAF FROM SAUDI ARABIA,  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AHMED TAIBI BENHIMA FROM  
MOROCCO, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ABDELAZIZ BOUTEFLIKA  
FROM ALGERIA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SABAH AL-AHMAD  
AL-JABIR AL-SABAH FROM KUWAIT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO,  
WILLIAM B. QUANDT, NSC STAFF, ALEX TOUMAYAN, DEPT. OF STATE  
INTERPRETER.

THE PRESIDENT BEGAN BY WELCOMING THE FOUR ARAB FOREIGN  
MINISTERS. MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAQQAF,

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AND EIGHTEEN ARAB COUNTRIES, THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON CONDITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO CHALLENGE ANYONE OR TO ASK FOR CHARITY. HE EMPHASIZED HIS BELIEF THAT THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAD OPPOSED THE ISRAELI-BRITISH-FRENCH AGGRESSION IN 1956, AND WHO HAD WORKED FOR PEACE ALL OVER THE WORLD, WOULD TURN HIS ATTENTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION.

MINISTER SAQQAF SAID THAT THE ARABS WANT TO REMAIN WITHIN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER, WHICH ALLOWS FOR SELF-DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 51. THE ARABS DO NOT ACCEPT THE OCCUPATION OF THEIR LAND. THEY ARE DEFENDING THEIR OWN LAND, TO RECOVER WHAT WAS TAKEN BY FORCE. THE CONTINUATION OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION THREATENS THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE ARABS ARE KEEN TO HAVE VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY STOPPING ISRAEL FROM HOLDING THE POST-1967 LANDS BY FORCE. PRESIDENT SADAT'S OFFER YESTERDAY WAS VERY REASONABLE AND PROVIDES A GOOD CHANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE STEPS TOWARD PEACE.

MINISTER SAQQAF EXPRESSED CONCERN AT US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. THIS IS SEEN AS BEING HOSTILE TO THE ARAB WORLD. THE ARABS WANT NO MORE THAN A RETURN TO THE 1967 BORDERS AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR LANDS OR BE COMPENSATED FOR WHAT THEY HAVE LOST. THIS WOULD BE ENOUGH TO GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY OF ISRAEL. THE ARABS DO NOT THREATEN ISRAEL WITH ANNIHILATION. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD GUARANTEE THE STABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF ALL THE MIDDLE EAST STATES, NOT JUST ISRAEL. THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE ARABS.

MINISTER SAQQAF STRESSED THAT THE ARABS WANT THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.

THE PRESIDENT THANKED MINISTER SAQQAF FOR HIS REMARKS, PARTICULARLY FOR HIS WILLINGNESS TO SEEK SOLUTIONS, NOT CONFRONTATIONS. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT PROMISE MORE THAN IT CAN DELIVER, AND USUALLY DELIVERS MORE THAN IT PROMISES. THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IS TRUST.

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Department of State

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THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE HAD TOLD SECRETARY KISSINGER AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS SECOND TERM THAT IT WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OBTAIN A JUST AND FAIR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE MENTIONED HIS TRAVELS TO THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HAD PROVIDED HIM WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSTAND THE

PROBLEMS AND PROMISES OF THE AREA. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE MIGHT VISIT SEVERAL ARAB COUNTRIES IN HIS SECOND TERM, HOPEFULLY ONCE PEACE HAD BEEN REACHED.

THE PRESIDENT THEN TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF US ARMS RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL, EXPLAINING HIS EFFORTS TO AVOID WAR BEFORE IT HAD BEGUN AND TO LIMIT ITS DIMENSIONS THEREAFTER. AFTER ONE WEEK, AND AFTER OVER 300 SOVIET PLANES HAD CARRIED ARMS TO EGYPT AND SYRIA, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT A BALANCE MUST BE PRESERVED. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL WILL END.

THE PRESIDENT THEN ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT, SAYING THAT NEW CONDITIONS NOW EXIST IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN USE ITS INFLUENCE TO GET NEGOTIATIONS OFF DEAD CENTER, LEADING TO A JUST AND EQUITABLE PEACE. HE STRESSED THAT THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE THOSE OF RESOLUTION 242, TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS FULLY COMMITTED. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WILL REQUIRE TALK AND NEGOTIATIONS. NEITHER SIDE CAN AFFORD TO TAKE AN ALL-OR-NOTHING STANCE.

THE PRESIDENT ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO CONVEY TO THEIR CHIEFS OF STATE THE US POSITION OF SUPPORTING A CEASEFIRE, TO BE FOLLOWED RAPIDLY BY NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE US WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT BASED ON RESOLUTION 242. THE PRESIDENT PROMISED TO WORK FOR THESE GOALS AND URGED RESTRAINT ON ALL PARTIES. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT US-ARAB RELATIONS WOULD IMPROVE, PARTICULARLY ONCE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.

SECRETARY KISSINGER ADDED THAT HOSTILITIES SHOULD END NOW SO THAT THE CHANCES OF PEACE ARE NOT LOST BY THE SPREAD OF THE CONFLICT OR BY GROWING INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPER-POWERS.

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FOREIGN MINISTER SABAH ASKED ABOUT US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THE UNITED STATES TOOK THESE MEASURES IN ORDER TO SET THE STAGE FOR A SETTLEMENT ONCE A CEASEFIRE IS REACHED. SECRETARY KISSINGER ADDED THAT IF THE BALANCE OF POWER WERE TO TILT TOWARD ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, THE RISK OF GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT WOULD GROW. THIS IS WHY A CEASEFIRE IS URGENTLY NEEDED.

MINISTER SAQQAF SAID THAT THE INTERPRETATION PLACED ON RESOLUTION 242 WAS AMBIGUOUS AND THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT CALLS FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL.

SECRETARY KISSINGER REPLIED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN ORDER TO CRYSTALLIZE THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES. ASKING ISRAEL NOW FOR A FLAT COMMITMENT TO FULL WITHDRAWAL WOULD RISK THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR. THE US CAN BEST PLAY A ROLE IN A PEACE SETTLEMENT WHEN FIGHTING HAS STOPPED AND NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEGUN. THE UNITED STATES FAVORS A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT, BUT CANNOT ASK FOR EVERYTHING FROM ISRAEL AT THE OUTSET.

THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THE DIRECTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IS WHAT MATTERS MOST. THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ARE FAVORABLE TO CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. HE REPEATED HIS COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT, EMPHASIZING AGAIN THAT HIS GOAL IS A CEASEFIRE LINKED TO A DIPLOMATIC EFFORT IN WHICH THE US WILL USE ITS FULL WEIGHT.

MINISTER SAQQAF THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS REMARKS.

THE PRESIDENT ENDED THE MEETING BY THANKING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR THEIR MODERATION. HE REPEATED THAT THE UNITED STATES UPHOLDS THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO EXIST. END TEXT. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:WSBUTCHER

APPROVED BY: S/S:MR.GAMMON

CLEARANCES: NEA:ALATHERTON

AFN:JJBLAKE

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-71 TSO-00 1031 N

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FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO-SECSTATE WASHDC 0208  
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AMCONGEN JERUSALFM  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR XF  
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST

1. IN MID-DAY ENCOUNTERS WITH USUN MTSOFFS OCT 16, ARAB DIPLOMATS AT UN WERE SOMETIMES OUTSPOKEN IN CRITICISM OF RESUPPLY AND OTHER US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL BUT GREETED US REPS CHEERFULLY, INITIATED SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS, AND PROVIDED CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT AMERICANS HAVE NOT BEEN WRITTEN OFF AS IMPLACABLE ENEMIES.

2. EGYPTIAN COUNSELOR KASSEM, HAILING POLCOUNS IN DELEGATES' LOUNGE, CHIDED US FOR "TAKING ACTIONS THAT CLOSE DOORS" BUT WENT ON TO EXPRESS HOPE ALL DOORS NOT CLOSED. HE CONFIDED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD SCHEDULED MEETING AT 11:00 AM OCT 17 WITH FIVE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS. HE DID NOT COMMENT EXPLICITLY ON THIS PROSPECT, BUT LEFT IMPRESSION HE REGARDED MEETING AS EXCITING, HOPEFUL PROSPECT. KASSEM DID NOT MENTION NON-ALIGNED, AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT ENCOURAGING THAT ME NOW BEING DISCUSSED VERY CONFIDENTIALLY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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AMONG SMALL NUMBER OF SENIOR STATESMEN.

3. BURHAN HAMAD, JORDANIAN CITIZEN OF PALESTINIAN ORIGIN NOW SERVING ON UAE DEL AFTER STINT WITH ARAB LEAGUE OFFICER HERE, TOLD MISOFFS ARABS HOPED US WOULD SOON COME FORWARD WITH "PROPOSAL" (HE DID NOT SPECIFY SC RES) FOR CEASEFIRE, CALL FOR ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTIONS FOR "MODALITIES" OF WITHDRAWAL, AND RECOMMENDATION FOR PEACE CONFERENCE. HAMAD OPINED THAT EGYPTIANS WERE UNIQUE AMONG ARABS IN DEGREE OF THEIR ATTACHMENT TO LAST INCH OF THEIR TERRITORY, BUT WOULD BE READY TO AGREE ON OTHER ISSUES ONCE ALL OCCUPIED EGYPTIAN TERRITORY RESTORED. HAMAD WAS SHARPLY CRITICAL OF US RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL, WHICH HE SAW AS MAINTAINING LONG-STANDING US ONE-SIDEDNESS.

4. JOUEJATI (PROTECT) OF ~~SYRIAN~~ MISSION WHISPERED CRYPTICALLY TO MISOFF "THERE IS ROOM FOR NAMEUVER. WE MUST NOT MISS THIS CHANCE." HE SUPPLIED HIS UNLISTED TELEPHONE NUMBER AND SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO BE CALLED AT ANY HOUR OF DAY OR NIGHT IF HE COULD BE HELPFUL. JOUEJATI IS NOT NORMALLY INCLINED TO BE MELODRAMATIC AND LEFT IMPRESSION HE MOTIVATED BY SINCERE CONCERN RATHER THAN DESIRE TO PROMOTE ROLE FOR HIMSELF.

5. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH AREA ADVISER, JOUEJATI SOUGHT REACTION TO SADAT'S "FIVE POINTS" IN OCT 16 SPEECH. ADVISER MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. YEMENI (YAR) DEP PERMREP AL-HADDAD ALSO PROBED AREA ADVISER FOR US REACTION TO SADAT SPEECH.

6. COMMENT: THESE LIMITED CONTACTS SUGGEST THAT ARABS IN NEW YORK ENCOURAGED TO HOPE THAT CURRENT HOSTILITIES IN ME HAVE CREATED OPENING FOR DIPLOMATIC MOVES OFFERING DISTINCT HOPE FOR HIGH-LEVEL INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ME. THEY ALSO SUGGEST THAT, DESPITE RESENTMENT OF US SUPPORT OF ISRAELI ENEMY, ARABS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE US CAN PLAY CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ME SETTLEMENT.  
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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, GW, EG, IS, XF  
SUBJECT: US DECISION RESUPPLY ISRAEL  
REF: BONN 15007

1. YOU MAY INFORM SCHEEL THAT FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE TO BE SHIPPED FROM FRG TO ISRAEL: 65 M60 TANKS FROM GERMERSHEIM; 23 155 MM HOWITZERS FROM MANNHEIM; 75,000 ROUNDS 105 AMMUNITION FROM MIESAU.

2. ABOVE ITEMS CURRENTLY AWAITING SHIPMENT TO BREMERHAVEN FOR TRANSPORT VIA ISRAELI VESSEL. WHILE THERE ARE NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO SHIP ADDITIONAL ITEMS WE CANNOT PRECLUDE FURTHER ISRAELI REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET FROM US STOCKS IN GERMANY. KISSINGER

BT  
#5537

DRAFTED BY: PM:LSLOSS:RES  
APPROVED BY: PM:SWEISS

CLEARANCE: NEA MR. ATHERTON  
EUR/NE MR. GEORGE  
OASD/ISA GEN SCHONING  
S/S-O R. ELTZ



Department of State *Urg* **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 513

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 12933 171616Z

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ACTION EUR=25

INFO OCT=01 YSO=00 SS0=00 NSCE=00 CCU=00 INRE=00 USSS=00  
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PA=04 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=20 USIA=15 ACDA=19  
ID=14 NFA=10 AF=10 SAJ=01 EA=11 OMB=01 DRC=01 /170 W  
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R 171547Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3139  
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
USMISSION BERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 12933

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR PINT UR  
SUBJ: KOSYGIN ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

1. JAPANESE EMROFF (PROTECT) WHO WAS INTERPRETER ON JAPANESE SIDE FOR TANAKA TALKS HERF HAS GIVEN US HIS OBSERVATIONS ON LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR DURING TALKS WHICH SEEM TO BEAR ON MANNER IN WHICH LEADERS WERE HANDLING CONCURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. DURING COURSE OF TALKS BOTH KOSYGIN AND GROMYKO LEFT CONFERENCE ROOM ON OCCASION, APPARENTLY TO DEAL WITH MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS. ON EACH OCCASION, BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, AND GROMYKO HUDDLED TOGETHER BEFORE APPOINTED INDIVIDUAL LEFT TALKS. AT ONE POINT, JAPANESE OBSERVED KOSYGIN AND GROMYKO LEAVE TALKS TOGETHER TO GO INTO CONFERENCE IN

CONFIDENTIAL

3



*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 12933 171616Z

ADJOINING ROOM WITH DEFENCE MINISTER GRECHKO AND FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNFTSOV, PRESUMABLY ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. FROM ABOVE IT APPEARS THAT KOSYGIN HAS PLAYED ACTIVE ROLE IN FORMULATING SOVIET POLICY FROM VERY BEGINNING OF CURRENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND THAT HIS TRIP TO CAIRO FOLLOWS NATURALLY FROM THIS ROLE.

3. THIS DEVELOPMENT OFFERS FOOD FOR THOUGHT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF INTERNAL LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS. IT SEEMS TO BE REVERSAL OF TREND WHICH OUTWARDLY AT LEAST HAD KOSYGIN DEALING INCREASINGLY WITH MARGINAL FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS AND, WHERE MAJOR POWERS SUCH AS U.S. AND JAPAN WERE INVOLVED, FOCUSING MAINLY ON ECONOMICS.

4. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT IT COULD BE SIGNIFICANT THAT KOSYGIN WHO HAS NOT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE PLACED SAME EMPHASIS ON DETENTE ISSUE AS BREZHNEV IS SUDDENLY BEING REACTIVATED ON A CRUCIAL MATTER WHICH COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT DETENTE, WE WOULD NOT AT THIS POINT DRAW ANY FAR-REACHING CONCLUSIONS. IT WOULD BE NATURAL THAT, AT TIME OF CRISIS, BREZHNEV SHOULD SEEK TO EMPHASIZE COLLECTIVITY IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS. BUT IT IS ALSO REASONABLE TO SPECULATE THAT PROLONGED MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, ACCCOMPANIED BY TENSIONS IN U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS, WOULD TEND TO UNDERMINE BREZHNEV'S POSITION WHICH WAS BUILT IN PART ON HIS STATURE AS PUTATIVE SOVIET ARCHITECT OF DETENTE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 4656Q  
RECD: OCT 17, 1973  
1311Z

255Z OCT 73  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9756  
BT  
S E C R E T AMMAN 5547

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFCR, JO  
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN ACTIVITY IN VALLEY

REF: STATE 205534

1. SAID TO KING THAT I NOT PASSING ON ISRAEL MESSAGE  
PUT THOUGHT HE SHOULD KNOW THAT ISRAELIS CONCERNED  
BY INCREASED JORDANIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN VALLEY.

2. KING SAID THIS IS TRUE. THERE ARE MORE SOLDIERS IN  
VALLEY. CONSIDERS THIS PART OF HIS DUTY IN PROTECTING  
LONG JORDAN-ISRAEL LINE. AS FOR ANY ACTION, HOWEVER,  
IT IS IN SYRIA.

3. COMMENT: KING WAS BIT ~~ONE~~ <sup>ONE</sup> HAND ON THIS AS IT  
FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY HIS REMARKS ON US RESUPPLY.  
WHAT HE MEANS IS THAT HE IS ~~HAVING~~ HAVING ENOUGH TROUBLE  
IN SYRIA WITHOUT TAKING ON ANYTHING ELSE.

BROWN

~~SECRET~~

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AF/N  
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A/WLG  
PM  
INR  
WH (LDX)  
DOD (LDX)  
CIA (LDX)  
NSA (LDX)  
PA/HO  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE  
Situation Report # 37

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, Oct. 17  
1973

Military Situation

An IDF spokesman reported a quiet night on the Golan and Sinai fronts. There was extensive terrorist activity in Northern Israel, with four settlements coming under mortar and bazooka shelling.

Israeli forces reportedly engaged Jordanian troops for the first time on October 16, with the Israelis claiming to have destroyed 25-30 Jordanian tanks in a three hour battle.

An Israeli raiding party consisting of 20 tanks continues to operate on the West Bank of the Canal in the vicinity of Deversoir. This force has reportedly destroyed three Egyptian missile sites.

The Israelis claim to have downed ten Syrian and 13 Egyptian aircraft on October 16 at a cost of only two Israeli aircraft.

Oil Developments

Six Gulf states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar) have unilaterally increased the posted prices for their crude oil by 17%. The decision to increase prices came after lengthy talks with the oil companies in Vienna under the aegis of OPEC.

Officials from Arab oil-producing states are meeting today in Kuwait to discuss using the "oil weapon" in the Middle East war. UPI, quoting Arab oil sources, reports that the oil ministers will freeze production at current levels but will not impose supply cutoffs.

SECRET/EXDIS  
GDS - DECLAS Dec. 21, 1981


*Mr. S. J. My  
later today*

SECRET/EXDIS

-2-

Arab Reaction to US Resupply

There were no significant overnight reports of Arab reaction to the US resupply effort.

APPROVED BY: 

JOHN T. HILL  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS



Department of State *Was*  
10/15  
**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 823 (5)

PAGE 01 STATE 205620

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 1500-00 1031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/IB8 ELLWOOD M. RABENOLD  
APPROVED BY S/S - SAMUEL R. GAMMON  
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER  
EUR - WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR.

R 171550Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LISBON

SECRET STATE 205620

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR, MASS, PO, IS  
SUBJECT: RESUPPLY FLIGHTS THROUGH LAJES TO ISRAEL

1. SECRETARY RECEIVED PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR AFTERNOON OCTOBER 15 TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR PORTUGUESE COOPERATION IN MAKING LAJES BASE AVAILABLE FOR URGENTLY NEEDED RESUPPLY FLIGHTS TO ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WHILE IT IS HARD FOR US TO MAKE COMMITMENTS AT THIS TIME, THE US WOULD NOT FORGET PORTUGAL'S COOPERATION. HE HAD MENTIONED TO THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING THAT WE WERE UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PORTUGAL.

2. AMBASSADOR THEMIDO REPEATED REMARKS HE HAD MADE EARLIER TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY STOESSEL REGARDING PORTUGUESE GRIEVANCES AGAINST US POLICIES. HE COMMENTED THAT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WAS PROUD OF THE RESULTS THAT IT HAD ACHIEVED IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA, AND THAT THERE WERE MANY ASPECTS OF PORTUGUESE POLICY THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD SUPPORT. PAST US POLICY HAD BEEN UNFRIENDLY. NEVERTHELESS PORTUGAL HAD SAID YES TO THE REQUEST TO USE LAJES KNOWING HOW SERIOUS THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE.

007138

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORNIGS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
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NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
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RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
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WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

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REF ID:  
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Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 205620

3. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD EXAMINE THE PORTUGUESE PROPOSALS (PORTUGUESE MORANDUM) WITH LARE, AND THAT THE GOP HAS A GREATER CLAIM ON OUR UNDERSTANDING THAN IT DID LAST WEEK. MR. STOESSEL WOULD GET BACK TO THE AMBASSADOR

ON DETAILS. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN LISBON, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE AN INVITATION TO GO. THE SECRETARY PROMISED TO FOLLOW THE PROGRESS OF THE AZORES BASE NEGOTIATIONS CLOSELY.

4. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SAID THAT THANKS TO THE ACTION OF THE PORTUGUESE, THE STALEMATE MIGHT BE BROKEN WHICH COULD RESULT IN CEASE FIRE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE WHICH SHOULD BE AS IMPORTANT TO PORTUGAL AS TO OURSELVES.

5. MEMCOM WILL FOLLOW. KISSINGER

ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC RELATION  
(USIA summary)

war  
10/17

Wednesday October 17

(Anman 5541  
LOU)

Jordan: all newspapers highlighted Jordan's entry into Golan battle and Sadat's speech. The wire service reports of U.S. resupply efforts for Israel were carried in the press but not featured. Inside pages carry Reuters and AFP story that pilotless U.S. plane was shot down near Damascus. Press also carries in low key Sen. Mansfield's statement that the US should not get involved in the war, and Dr. Kissinger's saying the US is not sending forces now but that the situation could change.

(FBIS 40  
10/17  
0952Z)

Egypt: Cairo Radio in Arabic, 8:00 am Cairo time:

Informed US military sources in Washington have stated that the US has actually provided Israel with 24 Phantom planes to replace its losses....President Nixon's advisor, Melvin Laird, attacked the Soviet Union, accusing it of obstructing the ending of the Mideast war.

(FBIS 20  
(Reuters  
RNR

Egypt: newspapers concentrated on Pres. Sadat's speech.  
-al Ahram editorial: The US will be mistaken if it believes it can use the international detente as an excuse for blackmail to freeze the Mideast crisis, to impose Israel's conditions as the basis for a settlement, and to embarrass the Soviet Union because it provides military support for liberating the occupied territory.

(FBIS 50  
OUO  
10/17  
1135Z)

Lebanon:

-al Anwar (pro-Cairo daily): all pressure exerted by the US on some Arab states to prevent the holding of an Arab oil conference in Kuwait today have failed. Reports from Damascus say that the conference will come out with important decisions against US interests in the area.

ANAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION  
(USIA summary)

Tuesday October 16

(Tripoli  
0649  
conf)

Libya: the 11:00 pm television news broadcast by government-controlled Libyan Television included reference to Pres. Nixon's remarks Monday on the Mideast, saying "the American president announces that the US might intervene militarily to protect the independence of Israel", and describing the landing of marines in Lebanon in 1958.  
-al Fajr al Jadid (regime-sponsored daily) p.1 headline: "Nixon announces probability of American intervention on the side of the enemy", subhead: "Americans confirm continued flow of arms to the enemy".  
-all media carry wire service reports of US aircraft transiting the Azores enroute to Israel, but the treatment is straightforward and low key. Some papers mention the rationale is the Soviet airlift.  
-Fajr al Jadid, p.3, headline "Damascus is steadfast" says the serial number plate from an Israeli Phantom had US Navy markings and "US property"; the accompanying photograph was captioned "This is evidence of the crime, America".  
(The reaction has been quite restrained. The Embassy reports that the lack of strong official reaction to the US resupply effort makes many Libyans believe this is evidence Qaddafi is an American agent!)

(Tunis 5952,  
conf)

Tunisia: media are negative on US resupply efforts, but restrained; they feature Bourguiba's letter to Pres. Nixon.  
-al Amal (organ of the ruling Dustour Party) editorial: How can providing Israel with weapons to "help her continue killing innocent civilians" provide the stable and durable peace the Americans say they are working for?  
-al Sabah (independent daily): editorial criticizes Pres. Nixon's "preference" for escalation of the war over the implementation of UN settlement resolutions, expresses surprise that Pres. Nixon Monday spoke of the integrity of states of the area. The editorial says the US has said in the past it will not exert any pressure on Israel.  
-L'Action (organ of ruling Dustour Party): editorial "Appeal to reason", calls for the US to save its image in the area by working rapidly for a settlement acceptable to everyone in the area.  
-La Presse (independent daily): editorial says Gerald Ford's support for Israel and his call for a quick military solution is expressing hope for an Israeli victory, and the columnist wonders if this really represents the official US viewpoint.

ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION  
(USIA Summary)

Tuesday Oct. 16

Jerusalem 1147 Israel: The Arabic press of Jerusalem gave prominent headlines to Pres. Nixon's remarks on the Mideast yesterday, and to a U.S. announcement of resupply for Israel including references to the Soviet airlift and the need to redress the balance.  
- al Quds (independent daily) editorial: The U.S. action to prevent a military imbalance is no surprise, but what is "strange" is the U.S. interest in one side and a "total neglect and lack of interest" in the other side. The U.S. cannot pose as a peace maker and defender of the rights of countries in the area because of its neglect of the rights of the Palestinian people.

Kuwait 3774 Kuwait: Government -operated Kuwait Radio, news at 1000 GMT, carried an Iraqi News Agency (INA) report stating "U.S. embassies in a number of Arab capitals have asked American citizens to depart from the Arab countries after Pres. Nixon announced America's intervention on the side of Israel in the war that is taking place in the Arab area." The INA "quoted Beirut press reports stating that U.S. embassies were charged to help U.S. nationals in evacuation by providing special means to return them to the U.S."

Beirut 12163 Lebanon: During the evening of Oct. 15 after news of the U.S. resupply and Pres. Nixon's remarks were broadcast, and on the morning of Oct. 16, loudspeaker trucks circulated through Muslim quarters of Beirut broadcasting anti-American propaganda, accusing the U.S. of providing military support for Israel and calling for unspecified strikes at American interests.

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ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION  
(USIA Summary)

Tuesday October 16

Cairo 3135  
LOU

Egypt: The biggest stories in the press are war news and Sadat's speech, but all Cairo daily papers frontpaged President Nixon's remarks yesterday on the Mideast and McCloskey's announcement of U.S. resupply efforts for Israel.

- Al Ahram: Among six frontpage banner headlines summarizing war developments were these two: "Threats to intervene to safeguard Israel's security", and (Moscow's) "Commitment to aid Arabs by all means to liberate their lands". The first headline referred to a story that Pres. Nixon had "hinted" that the "U.S. guarantees Israel's independence. The Washington wire service report added that Nixon did not speak directly about probability of US intervention, but said U.S. policy will be similar to that followed in 1958 in Lebanon and in 1970 in Jordan. The continuation of the story inside quoted McCloskey saying Nixon's statements do not necessarily lead to the assumption that the U.S. is threatening to send forces to Mideast. A frontpage editorial commented on this report saying US "cannot place troops alongside Israeli troops in Arab lands without fighting entire Arab nation" and it cannot repeat the 1956 Anglo-American subterfuge "to separate fighting parties." In the security council, the editorial added, the U.S. "will face certain rejection." Al Ahram's feature page carried the following reports by U.S. commentators: John Finney, New York Times: The U.S. decided to resupply Israel after "certainty that fight will be prolonged and the Israeli air force is getting weaker."

- George Sherman, Military editor, Washington Star-News: "Israel has lost one-third of its air and armored strength thus far." - U.S. military expert Drew Middleton: "Israel is expecting electronic devices the U.S. used in Vietnam."

- Lesly Gelb-Senator Jackson's view that "U.S. should support Israel firmly. "On the other hand, Senator Fulbright believes a big battle should be avoided in Sinai and the Egyptians should be allowed to stay where they are. The lead editorial urged all Arab countries to denounce "official U.S. intervention in supplying Israel with arms" and thus "counteract the U.S. challenge to the Arab nation"

- Al Akhbar: page 1. banner headlines: "U.S. announcement to resupply Israel, Nixon's armed intervention threat" and Soviet "Determination to help Arabs by all means." The lead story said Pres. Sadat's address Tuesday is in response to the

Cairo 3135  
con't

U.S. arms supply and Pres. Nixon's "indirect" intervention threat. Another story described the latter in more detail. The paper carried a separate story quoting the Egyptian official spokesman criticizing the resupply effort and giving details from wire service reports out of Washington and Lisbon. The foreign news page carried a short wire service item from Washington on Israel's request of "latest model" aircrafts".

Al Akhbar's "diplomatic reporter" said: "If serious, Nixon's threat to use force means the U.S. seeks to fight the entire Arab nation." Al Akhbar's columnist Muhammad Zahi Abdal Qadir said U.S. arms resupply to Israel "means the U.S. does not want peace in the Mideast." The U.S. "is hated in the Arab world and has forced the Arabs to carry arms in defense of their lands and dignity."

- al Gumhuriya: The second leading story on p.1 dealt with Pres. Nixon's "threat to intervene militarily" and the "U.S. airlift of arms to Israel". Next to this story, the paper published the official Egyptian spokesman's comment on the pro-Israeli stand of the U.S.

ARAB AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION  
(USIA Summary)

Tuesday, Oct. 16

Algiers 2032      Algeria

LOU

- Algiers Radio gave top billing to a report of the despatch of additional marines to the Mideast, linking it to President Nixon's remarks which "gave reason to believe in the possibility of US intervention". The station then reported McCloskey's resupply announcement  
- el Moudjahid (regime-supported daily): p.1 headline "Official: Washington rearms Israel"; separate headline reported Boumedien's trip to Moscow with a subhead: "From NATO bases, gigantic US aerial bridge to reinforce Zionist material and manpower strength." The article quotes McCloskey, but then adds the "gratuitous accusation against the USSR since no proof has been provided of Soviet shipments along normal air corridors." In a separate article reporting President Nixon's remarks, the paper concludes "direct intervention by U.S. forces cannot be discounted". The paper also printed an AFP story that 300 U.S. aircraft transited the Azores in the past  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours.

Khartoum 2296      Sudan: Press and radio gave banner treatment to arms resupply announcement, describing it as "US intervention". Media

Secret

featured alleged DOD confirmation of airlift (not seen at Embassy). Radio and editorial comment identifies US as main enemy supporting Israel, charges US intervention always favors Israel rather than Arab states. And calls for "direct action" through oil and finance. Beneath anti-imperialist verbiage, commentators note but discount Soviet arms supply and US rationale on maintenance and security all Middle East nations.

FBIS 77  
10/16 11472

Iraq: The official Iraqi News Agency in Arabic at 0835 GMT: Beirut--  
The U.S. Embassies in a number of Arab capitals have asked the American nationals to leave the Arab countries following President Nixon's announcement on U.S. intervention on the side of Israel in the current war in the area area.  
The newspaper al-Ahrar, organ of the socialist Arab Ba'th party, today reports that the American Embassies have been asked to help in the Evacuation of their nationals and to secure special means to return them to the United States.

ARA AND ISRAELI PUBLIC REACTION  
(USIA Summary)

Tuesday, October 16

Rabat 4684

LOU

Morocco: media reaction to the announcement the U.S. is resupplying Israel was restrained, giving the news factually but the media interpreted the President's remarks as an intervention threat no commenting were published.  
- al Alam (Opposition Istiqlal Party daily) headline: Nixon warns of U.S. military intervention to protect Israel"  
- l' Opinion (also Istiglal) headline: "U.S. A. ready to intervene military in the Middle East"  
- le Matin (pro-government daily) "Nixon reaffirms total support for Israel" but does not give the details of his remarks  
- Maghreb Informations ( trade union paper) headline: "American imperialism ready to intervene militarily"

Amman 5533

Conf.

Jordan: The government has ordered its officially-controlled radio station to limit commentary and avoid polemics in discussing the U.S.  
- Radio Amman in Arabic at 7:00 a.m. Amman time carried McCloskey's Monday statement together with a report of Boumedien's trip to Moscow seeking arms and a long report of Sen. Fulbright's call for cease-fire and Israeli withdrawal. The 8 and 9 a.m. news did not mention the item. The English service at 7 a.m. carried McCloskey's explanation that the resupply was in reaction to the Soviet airlift.

Tel Aviv 8197

Conf.

Israel: The press gives prominent coverage to the US efforts to resupply Israel, based exclusively on reports from Washington newspapers and wire service stories out of Lisbon. The public is focusing on this news as much as on the war news today.

Jidda 5200

Uncl.

Saudi Arabia: All Saudi newspapers omitted mention of both the McCloskey resupply announcement and President Nixon's comments on the Mideast yesterday. These two stories were widely played in other Arab media throughout the area, and the conspicuous omission in the Saudi press must have resulted from Ministry of Information orders to ignore these items which carry negative connotations for the U.S. The press does frontpage news of the arrival of Ambassador Akins to take up his duties.

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TELEGRAM

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USNATO 4977

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO  
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT: NAC MEETING  
OF OCTOBER 17

REF: (A) STATE 204576 (NODIS); (B) USNATO 4936 (NODIS);  
(C) USNATO 4937 (NODIS)

BEGIN SUMMARY: NAC CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST SITUATION  
ON OCTOBER 17 WITH SEVERAL DELEGATIONS PROVIDING INSTRUCTED COM-  
MENTS ON RUMSFELD'S OCTOBER 16 STATEMENT. ALL ALLIES WHO SPOKE  
STRESSED NEED FOR SOLIDARITY AND AGREED THAT MIDDLE EAST SITU-  
ATION POSED DANGERS FOR DETENTE. ALL EXCEPT FRANCE AGREED THAT THIS F  
ACT

SHOULD BE BROUGHT HOME TO MOSCOW. ALTHOUGH FRENCH AMBASSADOR  
AGREED THAT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION WAS DANGEROUS, HE STATED ON  
INSTRUCTIONS THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS DETENTE POLICY BE-  
CAUSE OF SOVIET POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST. INDEED AN EFFORT SHOULD  
BE MADE TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM HAVING  
AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE PROGRESS OF DETENTE IN OTHER AREAS,  
SPECIFICALLY IN EUROPE. OTHER DELEGATIONS REPORTED THAT THEIR  
GOVERNMENTS HAD ALREADY POINTED OUT TO SOVIETS THE RISKS TO  
DETENTE WHICH SOVIET ACTIONS WERE CREATING. SEVERAL REQUESTS  
WERE MADE FOR INFORMATION ABOUT CONTENT OF US-SOVIET CON-  
TACTS TO ASSIST IN JUDGING APPROPRIATE FUTURE ACTIONS. UK  
IN PARTICULAR COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONSULT  
MEANINGFULLY ON MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE SUGGESTED IN RUMS-  
FELD'S PRESENTATIONS (PARA 5D, REF A) IN ABSENCE OF MORE COM-  
PLETE KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET REPLIES TO US APPEALS. NAC WILL  
CONTINUE DISCUSSION ON MIDDLE EAST ON OCTOBER 19. END SUMMARY.

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Department of State  
**SECRET**

**TELEGRAM**

PAGE -2- USNATO 4977, OCT 17

1. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) PROPOSED THAT COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S OCTOBER 15 REMARKS BE HELD IN A MORE RESTRICTED AND MORE INFORMAL FORUM. DE STAERCKE SAID THIS WOULD FACILITATE FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION AMONG PERMREPS AND HELP PREVENT PRESS LEAKS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ALLIES WERE CONSIDERING A "BLOC" POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT. THE BULD OF THE OCTOBER 17 COUNCIL BUSINESS WAS FIRST DISPOSED OF, THEN THE COUNCIL MET IN PRIVATE SESSION TO CONTINUE THE MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSION.
2. SYG LUNS OPENED THE RESTRICTED CONVERSATION BY EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. STATEMENT ON OCTOBER 16 AND STATING TO AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD THAT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO DELEGATES IF THE COUNCIL COULD BE INFORMED OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED THE U.S. TO REASSESS SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND TO INITIATE THE RESUPPLY OPERATION IN ISRAEL.
3. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT WANT TO RE-ITERATE IN DETAIL WHAT HE HAD SAID THE PREVIOUS DAY, HE DID WANT TO ADDRESS SOME QUESTIONS WHICH HE HAD HEARD DURING THE 24 HOURS SINCE HIS OCTOBER 16 MIDDLE EAST STATEMENTS. HE ASKED THAT THE COMMENTS AT THIS COUNCIL MEETING BE DIRECTED TO THE STATEMENTS MADE THE PREVIOUS DAY AND NOT SIMPLY TO QUESTIONS FOR MORE INFORMATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT A CAREFUL RE-READING OF HIS STATEMENTS ON THE 16TH MIGHT PROVIDE ANSWERS TO MANY OF THE QUESTIONS HE HAS HEARD. HE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO PARAS 6, 7 AND 8 OF HIS FIRST STATEMENT ON THE 16TH, AND PARAS 2 AND 3 OF HIS SECOND STATEMENT (PARAGRAPH NUMBERS ACCORD WITH THOSE IN REF B). RUMSFELD SAID THAT IN THESE REMARKS THE U.S. HAD TRIED TO SET FORTH ITS VEIW OF WHAT THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO DETENTE OUGHT TO BE IN THE PRESENT CRISIS. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE LIST OF ACTIONS IN PARA 4 OF HIS SECOND STATEMENT ON THE 16TH WAS INTRODUCED AS: "AMCNG THE ACTIONS THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER TOGETHER." DELEGATES SHOULD NOTE THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT SAYING THAT THE U.S. HAD REACHED A CONCLUSION THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DO THESE THINGS. THE U.S. WAS SYAING IT THOUGHT THESE WERE AMONG THE ITEMS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. WE FOR OUR PART WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES.
4. THE BELGIAN REP (DE STAERCKE), ON INSTRUCTIONS, REPORTED THE FIRST REACTIONS OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT AS FCLLOWS:

A) HIS AUTHORITIES WERE "HAPPY" THAT AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD MADE THE STATEMENT;

**SECRET**

NONDISCLOSURE



Department of State  
SECRET

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B) THEY WERE PLEASED THAT IT WAS MADE WITHIN THE COUNCIL:

C) THEY THOUGHT THE PROBLEM OF THE FORM OF THE CONSULTATIONS ON THE U.S. STATEMENT WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE. THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FELT THAT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE MORE VALUABLE AND WOULD HELP AVOID NEWS LEAKS, PARTICULARLY NEWS LEAKS THAT MIGHT SPEAK OF FORMAL NATO ACTION;

D) HIS GOVERNMENT NOTED THAT THE TONE OF AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT WAS "QUITE FIRM AND STRONG," AND HIS GOVERNMENT RELATED THIS TONE TO THE CHARACTER OF THE CRISIS.

5. DE STAERCKE CONTINUED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT APPROVED OF HIS OWN REMARK MADE ON A PERSONAL BASIS ON THE PREVIOUS DAY ABOUT THE NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS AND SPECIFICALLY THE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE GENERAL UNDERLYING U.S. POLICY AS TO HOW FAR THE U.S. INTENDS TO GO IN THIS MATTER. IS THE U.S. SEEKING "MERELY A DEMONSTRATION OF SOLIDARITY? OR WILL WE GO FARTHER?"

6. DE STAERCKE CONCLUDED SUMMARY OF BELGIAN GOVERNMENT'S REACTIONS BY SAYING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIANCE BELGIUM AGREES IN GENERAL WITH THE U.S. POSITION. "WE WANT TO MAKE IT KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS OURSELVES; AND WE WANT TO HELP THE U.S. MAKE IT UNDERSTOOD BY THEM THAT THEY CAN'T GO BEYOND CERTAIN LIMITS."

7. THE CANADIAN REP (MENZIES) STATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS:

A) TO WELCOME THE U.S. INITIATIVE;

B) TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF REAL AND THOROUGH CONSULTATIONS ON THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER;

C) TO SAY HIS GOVERNMENT FEELS THE ALLIANCE SHOULD TRY, WHILE NOT ACTING AS A BLOC, TO ARRIVE AT SOME SORT OF CONSENSUS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THREE ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS: ITS IMPACT ON DETENTE; ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY QUESTIONS, SPECIFICALLY OIL; AND THE NEED TO MOVE TOWARDS THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION OF A SETTLEMENT.

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8. MENZIES CONTINUED BY SHARING HIS GOVERNMENT'S INITIAL ANALYSIS OF WHAT THE CANADIANS REARDED AS A CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE CANADIANS BELIEVE THE SOVIETS INITIALLY THOUGHT THE ARABS MIGHT NOT DO TOO WELL IN THIS CONFLICT. BUT, ON THE BASIS OF GOOD MILITARY PERFORMANCE AND GROWING COHESION AMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIES, THE SOVIETS THEN DECIDED THERE WERE OPPORTUNITIES TO FURTHER SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MENZIES SAID HIS GOVERNMENT FEELS THE LESSON FROM THIS ANALYSIS IS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DO WHAT THEY CAN TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT BROADER SOVIET INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.

9. MENZIES SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY STARTED THIS PROCESS AND RECOUNTED AN OCTOBER 16 CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE CANADIAN DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE BUREAU FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (BLACK) AND THE SOVIET DIRECTOR OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DIVISION OF THE MFA (SUSLOV). REPORTEDLY SUSLOV STATED U.S. REACTION (PRESUMABLY MILITARY RESUPPLY) HAD BEEN EXPECTED; THE USSR WANTED A JUST SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN AND RESOLUTION 242; BUT SINCE THE ISRAELIS ARE THE AGGRESSORS, THE SOVIETS MUST RELUCTANTLY SUPPORT THE ARABS. BLACK REPORTEDLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF DETENTE AND SAID THE BURDEN WAS ON BOTH SIDES TO REDUCE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE SITUATION.

10. AMBASSADOR PECK (UK) SAID THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS CAPITAL HE COULD SAY THAT THE BRITISH FELT THAT MORE FACTS WERE NEEDED ON EXCHANGES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR. ONLY WITH THE FULLER KNOWLEDGE OF THESE CONTACTS COULD THE ALLIES REACH SHOUD JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. MORE INFORMATION WOULD HELP THE ALLIES TO UNDERSTAND WHAT RISKS THE USSR WAS READY TO TAKE IN SUPPORT OF THE ARAB SIDE AND IN DEFIANCE OF US APPEALS. THEREFCRE,

LONDON FELT THAT IT WAS POSSIELE PREMATURE TO TAKE FINAL DECISIONS NOW. HOWEVER, LONDON HAD SOME PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON RUMSFELD'S SUGGESTIONS WHICH PECK COULD REVERT TO AT ANOTHER TIME.

11. PECK THEN REPORTED ON A CONVERSATION HELD "TWO OR THREE DAYS AGO" BETWEEN FCO UNDERSECRETARY DENNIS GREENHILL AND SOVIET AMBASSADCR LUNKOV. ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, GREENHILL HAD SUMMONED AMBASSADOR LUNKOV TO ASK ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE-EAST. LUNKOV SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY SAID THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS IN MANY WAYS IDENTICAL WITH THAT OF HMG. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT UN RESOLUTION

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242 WAS THE ONLY BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE CRISIS. GREENHILL ASKED LUNKOV WHETHER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DID NOT SEE THE DANGER TO DETENTE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, TO WHICH LUNKOV SAID THAT DETENTE WAS NOT IN DANGER. GREENHILL, HOWEVER, HAD STRESSED THAT THERE WOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES IN PROLONGING THE WAR. THE UK WANTED A DIRECT START TO NEGOTIATIONS AND A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. LONDON ALSO RECOGNIZED, GREENHILL SAID, THAT GUARANTEES WERE BOUND TO BE INVOLVED.

12. AMBASSADOR DE ROSE (FRANCE) STATED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED OVER THE TELEPHONE FROM PARIS THE FIRST REACTION OF HIS AUTHORITIES TO THE STATEMENT MADE BY RUMSFELD ON OCTOBER 16. DE ROSE SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE RUMSFELD STATEMENT AND HE PROCEEDED TO SUMMARISE ACCURATELY THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE STATEMENT. DE ROSE THEN ASSERTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS MOST CONCERNED WITH EXPLORING ANY POSSIBILITIES THAT MIGHT LEAD TO A CEASE-FIRE ON THE SPOT AND TO A CALMING OF TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DE ROSE RECALLED THAT FONMIN JOBERT HAD STATED ON OCTOBER 16TH IN THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THAT FRANCE WAS ALWAYS READY TO COOPERATE IN FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

13. DE ROSE CONTINUED, HOWEVER, THAT HIS AUTHORITIES DOUBTED THAT IT WAS TIMELY TO TELL THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE ENDANGERING DETENTE. DETENTE HAD ITS SPECIAL ASPECTS FOR EACH ALLIED COUNTRY. THERE WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE SPECIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR GERMANY. FOR FRANCE WHICH EMBARKED ON A POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERABLE EARLIER THERE WERE DIFFERENT ASPECTS. THE U.S. WITH ITS SALT NEGOTIATIONS, ITS SUMMIT MEETINGS AND PARTICULARLY THE AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR HAD ITS OWN SPECIAL INTERESTS ON DETENTE. TO DIFFERENT DEGREES AND WITH DIFFERENT METHODS EACH ALLIANCE MEMBER HAD ITS OWN INTEREST IN DETENTE.

14. DE ROSE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS UNPRECEDENTED FOR NATO TO CONSIDER ACTIONS RELATED TO A CONFLICT OUTSIDE THE NATO TREATY AREA. HE THOUGHT THE ALLIANCE IN PARTICULAR HAD NEVER DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST. TO DO THIS WOULD BE AN INNOVATION WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE THOUGHT ABOUT MOST CAREFULLY. DE ROSE SAID IT WAS CERTAIN THAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET POLICY HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE USSR AND AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST. AT PRESENT, THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS POSSIBLY POSED AN OBSTACLE TO DETENTE POLICY AS CONCEIVED.

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BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND BY BREZHNEV. AT THE LEAST, THE CRISIS GAVE EVIDENCE OF A LACK OF A SIMILAR VIEWPOINT BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT POWERS. HOWEVER, IT WAS POSSIBLE, DE ROSE ADDED, THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE SITUATION COULD HAVE TAKEN A FAR MORE DANGEROUS TURN FOR EVERYBODY.

15. CONTINUING, DE ROSE STRESSED THAT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE PRESENT TIME DID NOT NECESSARILY PUT AN END TO DETENTE POLICY ELSEWHERE AND ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. IN FACT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE DO WHAT WE CAN TO PREVENT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM AFFECTING OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. OTHERWISE, DETENTE POLICY WOULD ALWAYS BE IN TROUBLE ANYTIME THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR. IN CONCLUSION, DE ROSE SAID FRANCE FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT CAUSE THE SOVIETS TO FEEL THAT OUR COLLECTIVE POLICY VIS A VIS THE SOVIET UNION IS COMING TO AN END.

16. LUNS REMARKED THAT A PREVIOUS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WAS INDEED DISCUSSED IN NATO AND THAT THENATO MEDITERRANEAN GROUP ALWAYS CONSIDERS THE MIDDLE EAST IN MAKING ITS ASSESSMENTS. HE THEN READ FROM THE DECEMBER 4, 1970 NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE, PARAGRAPH 9, AS FOLLOWS: "AS A RESULT OF THEIR REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND ITS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS, MINISTERS EMPHASIZED THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN ALL EFFECT THE ALLIANCE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, AND HAVE A BEARING ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF REDUCING TENSIONS AND PROMOTING PEACE."

17. THE DANISH REP (SAVRT) SAID HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WELCOMED CONSULTATIONS. SVART REPORTED ON CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE DANISH PRIME MINISTER (PRESENTLY IN THE SOVIET UNION) AND BRESHNEV.

18. FRG REP (KRAPF) SAID HIS PERSONAL REACTIONS WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF PECK, I.E. WE NEED MORE INFORMATION INORDER TO ASSESS THE PRESENT SITUATION, PARTICULARLY INFORMATION ABOUT BILATERAL US-USSR CONTACTS. KRAPF WENT ON TO SAY THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS HE COULD SAY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS DETENTE INDIVISIBLE. ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY HE ADDED THAT SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL INEVITABLY HAVE AN EFFECT CN DETENTE EVERYWHERE ELSE. POINTING PARTICULARLY TO PARAGRPAH 6 OF RUMSFELD'S FIRST OCTOBER 16 REMARKS, RAPF SAID THAT IN DEMONSTRATING TO THE

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SOVIET UNION US DETERMINATION TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE U.S. WAS AT THE SAME TIME DEMONSTRATING THAT IT STICKS TO ITS WORK EVEN WHEN THE GOING IS DIFFICULT. THIS, SAID KRAPF, IS A LESSON FOR BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EUROPEANS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE US DETERRENT.

19. LUNS, SUMMARIZING, SAID HE FELT THE ALLIES AGREED ON NEED FOR SOLIDARITY AND COORDINATION BUT ALLIES PREFERRED ACTION DESIGNED TO IMPRESS THE SOVIET UNION ON INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL BASIS RATHER THAN NATO ACTION AS SUCH. SECONDLY, LUNS FELT THERE WAS A CONSENSUS

WAS A CONSENSUS OF WELCOME FOR THE U.S. STATEMENTS OF THE 16TH AND GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR FURTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY ON SOVIET-US BILATERAL CONTACTS. LUNS, LOOKING AT DE ROSE, SAID HE ALSO FELT THERE WAS ALLIANCE AGREEMENT WITH AMBASSADOR KRAFF THAT DETENTE WAS INDIVISIBLE AND THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD SEE IN THE SWIFT U.S. ACTION A LESSON IN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE DETERRENT.

20. CONCLUDING THE GENERAL DISCUSSION, RUMSFELD RETURNED TO THE KASTL REPORT, ASKING THAT SPECIAL CARE BE TAKEN TO PREVENT ITS CONTENTS FROM BEING RELEASED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS. SYG LUNS STRONGLY SUPPORTED THIS POINT. RUMSFELD WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE SUPPORTED DE STAERCKE'S SUGGESTION THAT SPECIAL PROCEDURES BE FOLLOWED TO ENSURE THE PRIVACY OF NAC DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. RUMSFELD ALSO STATED THAT HE VALUED THE COMMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE INSTRUCTED COMMENTS, THAT HAD BEEN PROVIDED SO FAR BY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. HE BELIEVED FURTHER THAT SYG LUNS HAD DRAWN THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PRECEDING DISCUSSION OF THE COUNCIL.

21. RUMSFELD CONTINUED WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE U.S. IN FACE OF FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO PREVENT WAR FROM BREAKING OUT, IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET AIRLIFT, IS TRYING TO REDUCE THE INCENTIVES FOR SOVIET ADVENTURE SOME TACTICS OF WHICH, IF THEY SUCCEED, EUROPE COULD EVENTUALLY BE A VICTIM.

22. RUMSFELD SAID HE HAD NOTED COMMENTS ON THE NATURE OF DETENTE AND WHETHER IT WAS GLOBAL OR WHETHER IT WAS DIVISIBLE. HE HAD ALSO NOTED LUNS' COMMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. RUMSFELD THEN RECALLED THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE FROM HIS OCTOBER 16 STATEMENT: "IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY FAILURE OF DETENTE OR SOVIET VIOLATION OF COMMITMENTS, IT INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS BUT THE RELATIONSHIP

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BETWEEN THE USSR AND ALL THOSE WESTERN NATIONS WHICH IN RECENT YEARS HAVE PURSUED A NORMALIZATION OF REALATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HAVE SIGNED VARIOUS AGREEMENTS WITH IT." RUMSFELD NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT A NUMBER OF THE COUNTRIES WHOSE REPRESENTATIVES HAD SPOKEN THIS MORNING HAD SIGNED SUCH AGREEMENTS WITH THE USSR.

23. RUMSFELD FOUND THE REPORTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE BY VARIOUS SPEAKERS ON CONTACTS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS HELPFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. FOR HIS PART, RUMSFELD WANTED TO STRESS WHAT HE HAD SAID EARLIER, NAMELY THAT THE PRESENT CRISIS IS A TEST OF THE EVOLVING SPIRIT OF DETENTE AND EACH OF THE ALLIES HAD JUST AS MUCH AT STAKE.

24. SPEAKING OF THE ACTION THE U.S. HAD SUGGESTED FOR CONSIDERATION, RUMSFELD underscored the fact that he had made no proposals for either collective or individual action. However, he thought it was premature to say, as some had been saying, that any action decided upon should necessarily be on an individual basis.

SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE THOUGHT THAT THE FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO DISCUSS WHAT MIGHT BE DONE AND THEN DECIDE WHETHER THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE undertaken INDIVIDUALLY OR JOINTLY.

SINCE WE DON'T YET HAVE ANSWERS TO THE FIRST, HE WOULD NOT WANT TO PREJUDGE THE SECOND, THUS HE WOULD NOT WISH TO HAVE THIS DISCUSSION PROCEED UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT EVERYONE AGREED THAT ALL JOINT MEASURES WERE NECESSARILY RULED OUT AT THIS POINT.

25. FINALLY, RUMSFELD SAID THAT IN A CONSULTATION IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EACH COUNTRY CONTRIBUTE WHAT IT THINKS ABOUT A PARTICULAR PROBLEM. IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE IT, BUT IT IS SOMETIMES EASY TO SAY THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE UNTIL MORE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE. FIRST, HE SAID, LET'S LOOK AT WHAT WE BELIEVE WE MIGHT WISH TO DO, THEN SEE IF WE HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION. THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION NEEDED TO MAKE A DECISION TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL WITH MUNITIONS AND THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION NEEDED TO DECIDE TO IMPRESS THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO JEOPARDIZE DETENTE ARE NOT OF THE SAME ORDER, RUMSFELD SUGGESTED.

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26. IN A RESUMED COUNCIL SESSION DURING THE AFTERNOON, DUTCH CHARGE (BUWALDA) STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES SHARED THE OPINION OF OTHERS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD DISCUSS THE MIDDLE-EAST SITUATION WHICH COULD BE DAMAGING TO DETENTE. THE DUTCH WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE'S OPINION-FORMING PROCESS. IN CONTRAST TO VIEWS OF OTHER DELGATIONS, FURTHERMORE, THE NETHERLANDS BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THAT THE COUNCIL WAS DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COULD HAVE A USEFUL EFFECT. ALTHOUGH THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT DID NOT HAVE PRECISE INSIGHTS INTO THE PURPOSES OF SOVIET ACTIONS, THEY TEND TO SHARE THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO A DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SOVIET ACTIONS COULD DELAY ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE AND BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT HAD UNDERSTANDING FOR THE U.S. RESUMPTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL TO RE-ESTABLISH THE EQUILIBRIUM. THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT SUBSCRIBED TO THE VIEW THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD MAINTAIN THEIR SOLIDARITY VIS A VIS THE SOVIETS AND IN THAT SPIRIT THE NETHERLANDS WAS PREPARED TO EXAMINE STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY SOME OR ALL OF THE ALLIES. HOWEVER, THESE STEPS REQUIRED CAREFUL EXAMINATION AND THE DUTCH HOPED THAT THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR WILL PROVIDE NATO WITH AN EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION. THE DUTCH BELIEVE THAT MEASURES WHICH WOULD ESCALATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION SHOULD BE AVOIDED. ACCORDINGLY, THE NETHERLANDS TENDS TO FAVOR DEMARCHEs TO THE USSR AND TO EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. FONMIN VAN DER STOEL PLANNED TO SUMMON THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN THE HAGUE OCTOBER 18 TO POINT OUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET ACTIONS.

27. LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADOR (FISCHBACH) COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS, OF COURSE, A LINK BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES. FOR THE MOMENT, THE FIRST PREOCCUPATION OF LUXEMBOURG WAS THAT BELLIGERENTS SHOULD GET TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE AND TO ACHIEVE THAT INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY WOULD BE NEEDED. BILATERAL CONTACTS AND JOINT EFFORTS INCLUDING THOSE BETWEEN EC-9 WERE NEEDED. LUXEMBOURG ALSO AGREED THAT THERE WERE RISKS TO DETENTE INHERENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE TOLD OF OUR APPREHENSIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF DETENTE IF ONE SIDE ESCALATES THE WAR.

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28. AMBASSADOR CATALANO (ITALY) STATE THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD NOTED RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 16 AND FELT THAT IT WAS JUSTIFIED AND THAT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN THE ATLANTIC FORUM. SOLIDARITY AMONG THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT SUFFER AND HARMONIZATION OF ALLIED VIEWS WOULD BE ACHIEVED IF DE STAERCKE'S CALL FOR DISCREET, INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN THE COUNCIL WERE HEeded. THIS CONSULTATION WAS HELPFUL EVEN IF THE AREA IN QUESTION WAS OUTSIDE THE NATO TREATY AREA. HOWEVER, ROME DID NOT THINK THAT DETENTE POLICY SHOULD BE COMPLETELY DISMANTLED AND EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO EASE TENSIONS. EVERY METHOD, BOTH MULTILATERAL AND UNILATERAL, SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO DISCOURAGE ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT. ITALY HAD ALREADY TAKEN STEPS IN MOSCOW AND IN OTHER INTERESTED CAPITALS TO THIS END.

29. AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) REFERRING TO RUMSFELD'S REMARK THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE MULTILATERAL ACTIONS, SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT A POSITIVE ANSWER HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN BY THE COUNCIL TO RUMSFELD'S APPEAL FOR SOLIDARITY. EVEN THE FRENCH COMMENT HAD NOT CHANGED THAT FACT. DE STAERCKE BELIEVED THAT INDEPENDENTLY, EACH ALLY SHOULD TRY TO SHOW THE SOVIETS HOW DANGEROUS IT WOULD BE FOR THEM TO GO TOO FAR. REFERRING TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S EARLIER REMARKS, ABOUT DETENTE, DE STAERCKE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION WAS LIKE CHOLERA, A CONTAGION THAT DID NOT RESPECT BORDERS. WHEN AN INFECTION APPEARED IN A PLACE CLOSE TO EUROPE, IT COULD NOT HELP BUT AFFECT EUROPE. DETENTE WAS INDEED GLOBAL AND THERE WERE BOUND TO BE CERTAIN REPERCUSSIONS ON THE ALLIES OF WHAT HAPPENED IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

30. SYG LUNS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD DE STAERCKE TO BE SAYING THAT ALL THE ALLIES AFTER CONSULTATIONS SHOULD TAKE A SIMILAR LINE. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT HE HOPED FOR THAT.

31. RUMSFELD, REFERRING TO COMMENTS ABOUT U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL, SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE PRECISE IN TERMINOLOGY THAT WAS USED. THE U.S. WAS ENGAGED IN A "RESUPPLY" OF ISRAELI FORCES. THIS WORD WOULD HELP TO PUT THE SIZE OF THE U.S. AID TO ISRAEL IN SOME PERSPECTIVE.

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32. AMBASSADOR DE ROSE (FRANCE) REBUTTED LUNS' CITATION EARLIER IN THE MEETING OF THE DEC 1970 NATO COMMUNIQUE REGARDING THE IN-DIVISIBILITY BY REMARKING THAT THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE HAD BEEN EERLIN. DE ROSE REPEATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES DID NOT AGREE TO SAYING TO THE SOVIETS THAT FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO STOP DETENTE POLICY BECAUSE OF SOVIET PCILCY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. FRANCE WOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE MEASURES WHICH WOULD SEEK TO REMOVE THE DANGERS TO DETENTE.

33. SYG LUNS REPLIED THAT, OF COURSE, EVERYONE FAVORS DETENTE BUT HE WENT ON TO QUOTE A FINANCIAL TIMES ARTICLE QUOTING MEL LAIRD AS SAYING THAT THE U.S. WAS NOW IN A STATE OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR AND THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT ACTING IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DETENTE WHICH THEY HAD NEGOTIATED WITH PRESIDENT NIXON. IN CONCLUDING, THE SYG REQUESTED ALL AMBASSADORS TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ACHIEVING A CONSENSUS WHICH COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF DIPLOMACY. THECOUNCIL AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19.

34. COMMENT: IN MISSION'S VIEW NAC DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS HAVE BEEN MOST USEFUL IN SEVERAL WAYS. THE TONE AND CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN VERY POSITIVE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE US STATEMENT HAS ALERTED ALLIES TO THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE US VIEWS THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. FURTHERMORE, IN PROVIDING ALLIES WITH BETTER BACKGROUND FOR CONTACTS THEY ARE AND WILL BE HAVING WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS, WE BELIEVE DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALSO SERVED TO STIFFEN ALLIED BACKBONES IN STANDING WITH US OR AT LEAST IN GIVING MORE SYMPATHETIC UNDER-STANDING TO US ACTIONS. EVEN IF ALLIES IN THE END ARE UNAEL TO AGREE FULLY ON A COMMON PROGRAM OF ACTION WE BELIEVE THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE PROVIDED A FRAME OF REFERENCE THAT WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE US TO CARRY OUT ESSENTIAL ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WILL BE HELPFUL IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS HERE IF WE COULD BE PROVIDED WITH AN INDICATION OF WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIONS WE WOULD LIE SOVIETS TO TAKE IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURES WHICH ALLIES MIGHT EXERT ON THEM. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE HAVING ANY GENERAL COMMENT THAT COULD BE MADE TO ALLIES AS TO U.S. INTENTIONS IF WAR CONTINUES AT PRESENT LEVEL FOR A SUBSTANTIALLY LONGER PERIOD OF TIME.

END COMMENT.

RUMSFELD

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SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR

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1. AT THE OUTSET OF OUR CONVERSATION, MRS. MEIR EXPRESSED ISRAEL'S DEEP GRATITUDE FOR OUR SUPPORT. SHE NOTED SHE HAD TRIED TO EXPRESS THIS SENTIMENT IN ISRAEL IN HER KNESSET SPEECH YESTERDAY, BUT REALIZED NOT EVEN THAT EFFORT SAID IT ALL ADEQUATELY.

2. SHE STATED THAT ISRAEL WELL RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE DECIDED TO COME TO ISRAEL'S RESCUE WITH LARGE SCALE MILITARY RESUPPLY. (SHE ADDED THAT THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD SHOULD REALIZE THAT AN IMPORTANT BY-PRODUCT OF US ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL WILL BE TO PRECLUDE SOVIET DOMINATION OF THE MID EAST). ?  
SHE HOPES, HOWEVER, TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY PERSONALLY TO TRY TO EXPRESS TO THE PRESIDENT WHAT AMERICAN AID MEANS IN HUMAN TERMS HERE, SINCE EVERY FAMILY THROUGHOUT THE LAND IS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT TRAGEDY. SHE ADDED WITH RESTRAINED EMOTION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO AID ISRAEL AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT WILL BE EMBLAZONED IN THE HISTORY BOOKS READ BY ALL FUTURE GENERATIONS OF JEWS.

3. I THEN EXPLAINED TO MRS. MEIR THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROACHING HOST COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO EXPLAIN AND SUPPORT OUR DECISION TO RESUPPLY ISRAEL WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT. DRAWING ON THE APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE, I PASSED TO HER OUR LINE. SHE WAS QUITE INTERESTED AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR BEING SO INFORMED.

4. TURNING TO ANOTHER SUBJECT, I NOTED PRESIDENT SADAT'S SPEECH AND MRS. MEIR'S ADDRESS TO THE KNESSET. ALTHOUGH WE WELL APPRECIATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD FIND SADAT'S "OFFER" UNACCEPTABLE, I NOTED THAT SHE HAD, UNDOUBTEDLY BY DESIGN, NOT ADDRESSED SADAT'S SUGGESTION OF A PEACE CONFERENCE. I WONDERED, THEREFORE, IF THE GOI WAS PLANNING SOME SORT OF RESPONSE. I SAID, EMPHASIZING THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, IT COULD BE A MISTAKE TO LEAVE THE "PEACE INITIATIVE" IN SADAT'S HANDS, SINCE THE GREAT MASSES OF

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

72 - TEL AVIV 826, 17 OCT '73

PEOPLE IN THE WEST TO WHOM HIS COMMENTS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO UNDERSTAND THE SUBTILITIES OF THE SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, I THOUGHT SHE MIGHT CONSIDER STATING PUBLICLY AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED AT A MOMENT'S NOTICE TO ATTEND A PEACE CONFERENCE OF ALL THE BELLIGERENTS, SINCE IT IS NORMAL INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE FOR THOSE COUNTRIES ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES TO ATTEND PEACE CONFERENCES. IF SADAT THEN REFUSED, THE PUBLIC ONUS WOULD BE DIRECTLY ON EGYPT.

5. MRS. MEIR REPLIED THAT SHE APPRECIATED MY VIEWS AND THE IDEA WAS WORTH CONSIDERING. SHE THEN POINTED OUT HOW A CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION SINCE IT IS A STACKED DECK. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT OBVIOUSLY ISRAEL WANTS PEACE MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE - NOTING THAT THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZED THIS IN MAKING HIS DECISION ON MILITARY RESUPPLY. THE WORLD CAN BE ASSURED, SHE SAID, THAT ISRAEL "WILL RUN" TO ANY PEACE CONFERENCE THAT REALLY PROMISED A SETTLEMENT AND TRUE PEACE. I NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN OUR MINDS, OF COURSE, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ISRAEL TAKE EVERY APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SURE THAT THE WORLD AT LARGE ALSO GETS THIS MESSAGE.

6. MRS. MEIR, IN DISCUSSING ATTITUDES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, MENTIONED WITH OBVIOUS DISGUST THE CYNICAL ATTITUDES OF THE UK AND FRANCE. AS CONCERNING THE UK, SHE WONDERED WHY SOMEONE DIDN'T ASK SIR ALEC HOME WHERE BRITAIN WOULD BE TODAY IF THE US HAD DECIDED TO EMBARGO ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE BELLIGERENTS BEFORE DECEMBER 7, 1941. AS FOR THE FRENCH, SHE WONDERED WHO THEY WERE KIDDING BY GIVING THE IMPRESSION THEY WERE AGONIZING OVER THE DELIVERY OF THE LAST THREE MIRAGES TO LIBYA, SINCE THEY HAD ALREADY DELIVERED NINETY. SHE SAVED MOST OF HER IRE, HOWEVER, FOR THE "NON-ALIGNED" YUGOSLAVS. IN ADDITION TO FREELY LENDING THEIR AIR SPACE TO THE SOVIET AIR LIFT, THE YUGOSLAVS, SHE CLAIMED, ARE NOW ALLOWING SOVIET EQUIPMENT TO ENTER THE COUNTRY ON THE RAILROADS AND TO BE LOADED AT YUGOSLAV PORTS FOR DELIVERY TO THE ARABS. IN THIS RESPECT, SHE SAID THAT ISRAEL HAD LEARNED THIS MORNING THAT ALL CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ON THE YUGOSLAV RAILROADS HAD BEEN STOPPED IN ORDER TO SERVICE THE HEAVY DEMANDS FOR TRANSPORT OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT THE GOI WAS OF COURSE WORRIED ABOUT REPORTS OF SCUD MISSILES IN EGYPT AND PERHAPS IN SYRIA. SHE DESCRIBED EARLIER REPORTS OF THE SOVIETS HAVING EVACUATED ALL OR MOST OF THEIR ADVISERS FROM EGYPT AND SYRIA AS "BLUFF." SHE SAID THAT MANY ARE LEFT, PRIMARILY

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- 3 - TEL AVIV 826, 17 OCT '73

TECHNICANS WHO ARE THERE TO HELP THE ARABS LEARN TO OPERATE THE NEW SOPHISTICATED ARMS WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE BRINGING IN.

8. CONCERNING THE CURRENT MILITARY OUTLOOK, MRS. MEIR SAID THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME BECAUSE "WE DON'T DARE LOSE THE WAR." SHE ADDED THAT THERE WAS, OF COURSE, NO COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SITUATION EIGHT DAYS AGO AND TODAY (OBVIOUSLY MEANING THINGS WERE MUCH BETTER FOR ISRAEL). WHILE NOT HAZARDING A GUESS AS TO HOW LONG THE WAR WOULD LAST, SHE DID NOTE THAT, IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING FURTHER BLOODSHED, IT'S TOO BAD IT COULDN'T BE ENDED TOMORROW, BUT THIS, OF COURSE, WAS NOT IN THE CARD

9. WITH REGARD TO THE NORTH, SHE NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CHEWING UP THE SYRIANS, IRAQIS AND, UNFORTUNATELY, THE JORDANIANS AS THEY STAGE THEIR PERIODIC ATTACKS. REFERRING TO THE JORDANIANS, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT SHE WAS SORRY THAT JORDANIANS WERE GETTING HURT IN THIS WAR AND SHE RECOGNIZED THAT ISRAEL AND THE US DID ALL WE COULD TO KEEP THEM OUT OF IT. SHE SAID "I FEEL SORRY FOR HUSSEIN" WHO FOUND HIMSELF UNDER SUCH HEAVY PRESSURE TO JOIN IN. MRS. MEIR REFERRED TO A RECENT REPORT SHE HAD RECEIVED FROM THE IDF THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BOLTED THE FIELD DURING A RECENT ATTACK AND LEFT THE JORDANIANS ALL ALONE.

10. IN THE SOUTH, SHE SAID THAT IDF FORCES WERE ON THE WEST BANK AND THAT SHE ASSUMED THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO KNOCK OUT ENOUGH SAMs TO ALLOW THE AIR FORCE TO WORK ON THE EGYPTIAN FORCES AND PERHAPS "HELP KNOCK SOME RESPONSIBILITY INTO SADAT'S HEAD." SHE WONDERED ALOUD IF SADAT REALLY MEANS TO LOSE ONE MILLION MEN A YEAR. CONTINUING, SHE NOTED THE REPORTS THAT SADAT HAD ORDERED THE PREPARATION OF UP TO 62 THOUSAND GRAVES. AT ANY RATE, SHE SAID, THE EGYPTIANS SEEMED TO HOPE FOR A WAR OF ATTRITION ON THE PATTERN OF 1963-1970 "BUT SO FAR THEY'RE NOT DOING SO WELL." ?

11. COMMENT: THE MEETING LASTED FOR CLOSE TO AN HOUR. SEVERAL TIMES I SUGGESTED THAT I WAS OVERSTAYING MY WELCOME AND MRS. MEIR KEPT ME ON NOTING THAT SHE APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. MRS. MEIR'S COMMENTS ON JORDAN AND HUSSEIN WERE ENCOURAGING TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, INTEND TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EXTEND THE WAR TO JORDANIAN TERRITORY BECAUSE OF THE ENGAGEMENTS WITH JORDANIAN TROOPS. THIS SEEMED SO OBVIOUS THAT I DID NOT THINK IT WAS NECESSARY TO COMMENT

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- 4 - TEL AVIV 826, 17 OCT '73

ON THIS ASPECT OF OUR CONVERSATION. IF IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PI  
WILL PICK UP THE CALL FOR A PEACE CONFERENCE IN SADAT'S SPEECH AND  
USE IT FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES INTERNATIONALLY.

12. FINALLY, I FOUND MRS. MEIR TO BE IN VERY GOOD PHYSICAL AND  
MENTAL CONDITION. SHE TOLD ME SHE HAD BEEN GETTING SLEEP RECENTLY  
AND IT WAS CLEAR FROM HER COMMENTS THAT SHE WAS VERY HEARTENED  
BY THE SOLIDARITY WITH WHICH THE KNESSET GREETED HER REMARKS  
YESTERDAY. THERE IS ANGUISH, OF COURSE, IN HER GENERAL Demeanor  
BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR SHE CONSIDERES EVERY ISRAELI CASUALTY AS A  
PERSONAL LOSS. THE DOMINANT CHARACTERISTICS I NOTED, HOWEVER,  
WERE A GRIM DETERMINATION AND MATTER-OF-FACT CONFIDENCE IN THE  
FUTURE COUPLED WITH GRATITUDE TO THE UNITED STATES.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 08236 171333Z

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 10-03 FUR-10 SAJ-01 PM-03 NSC-10

NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 L-02 PRS-01

ACDA-10 DRC-01 AF-05 SSO-00 1078 W

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P R 171039Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1396  
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA  
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL  
AMCONSUL IZMIR  
USMISSION USUN  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
USCINCEUR  
CINCUSAFE  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T ANKARA 8236

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, UR, TU  
SUBJECT: TURK FONMIN OUTLINES VIEWS ON RESOLUTION OF  
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT TO SOVIET AMB

REF: ANKARA 8191

BEGIN SUMMARY: BAYULKEN TOLD ME THAT HE HAD OUTLINED  
TO THE SOVIET AMB ON OCT 15 THE SAME THREE-POINT AGREEMENT  
FOR ENDING THE ME CONFLICT WHICH HE HAD EXPLAINED TO ME  
EARLIER THAT SAME DAY (REFTEL). THE SOVIET AMB HAD APPEARED  
VERY INTERESTED, BAYULKEN SAID, AND HAD INDICATED HE WOULD  
CONVEY THE PROPOSAL TO MOSCOW FOR COMMENT. I REITERATED  
MY STRONG DOUBTS THAT THE FORMULA WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO  
ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

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1. I MET ON OCT 16 WITH FONMIN BAYULKEN AT HIS RESIDENCE. BAYULKEN DISCLOSED THAT DURING HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET AMB ON OCT 15 OVER SOVIET OVERFLIGHT NOTIFICATION HE, BAYULKEN, HAD ALSO OUTLINED HIS THREE-POINT PROPOSAL FOR ENDING THE FIGHTING IN THE ME AND BRINGING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. THIS PROPOSAL WAS IDENTICAL TO WHAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED TO ME (REFTEL). IT WOULD INVOLVE: (A) A CEASE-FIRE; (B) A REAFFIRMATION OF SC 242; AND (C) A TIMETABLE AGREED UPON PRIOR TO THE CEASE-FIRE BY THE ISRAELIS FOR A PHASED RETURN TO THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS NOTED IN RESOLUTION 242.

2. ACCORDING TO BAYULKEN, THE SOVIET AMB APPEARED VERY INTERESTED. THE SOVIET IN FACT SAID HIS PERSONAL REACTION WAS A VERY POSITIVE ONE AND THAT HE WOULD INFORM MOSCOW.

3. I ASKED BAYULKEN AT THIS JUNCTURE WHAT HE HAD IN MIND AS A TIMETABLE. BAYULKEN INDICATED IN A FUZZY FASHION THAT HE WAS THINKING OF A PULL-BACK OF FIVE TO TEN KILOMETERS WITHIN THREE MONTHS, FOLLOWED BY SIMILAR PULL-BACKS AT VARIOUS INTERVALS.

4. I THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE THOUGHT TURKISH CONCERN OVER THE ME SITUATION WAS SURELY WARRANTED AND THAT IT WAS ADMIRABLE THAT TURKEY WAS TRYING TO SEE WHETHER, WITH ITS ASSETS IN THE REGION, IT COULD BE HELPFUL IN FINDING A LONG-TERM SOLUTION WHILE BRINGING THE HOSTILITIES TO AN END. ALTHOUGH MY GOVT HAD NOT YET SENT ME ITS REACTION, I SAID I CONTINUED TO FEEL HIS THIRD POINT WAS A NON-STARTER IN THAT I COULD NOT CONCEIVE OF THE ISRAELIS ACCEPTING IT AS PRESENTLY FORMULATED. THE EFFECT WOULD BE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO GIVE AWAY THEIR TRUMP CARD (TERRITORY) AT A TIME WHEN THEY CERTAINLY ARE NOT LOSING THE WAR. EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD SACRIFICE THIS TRUMP CARD IN THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, THERE REMAINED THE TROUBLING POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARABS WOULD HAVE THEIR APPETITES WHETTED AND WOULD SEEK ULTIMATELY TO GAIN BACK EVEN MORE TERRITORY, PERHAPS GOING BACK TO THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I NOTED, I WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE THIS PROPOSAL. I ADVISED HIM, HOWEVER, IF HE PLANNED TO PURSUE HIS EFFORTS

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ACTIVELY, HE SHOULD TRY TO FIND A FORMULATION WHICH WOULD BE MORE ATTRACTIVE FROM THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW.

5. BAYULKEN TO SOME DEGREE CLARIFIED HIS INTENTIONS BY STATING THAT HE DID NOT PLAN THAT TURKEY WOULD BECOME A MEDIATOR AS SUCH. HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT TURKEY WAS RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES IN THE CONFLICT AND ALL KNEW THAT TURKEY HAD NO SPECIAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA. MOREOVER, TURKEY DEFINITELY IS NOT TAKING SIDES. IF THERE WAS ANY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO HIS IDEA, TURKEY WOULD WISH TO CONSULT IN DEPTH WITH ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING NOT ONLY THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS, BUT ALSO THE USSR AND ESPECIALLY THE US.

6. COMMENTS DURING THIS MEETING (AND EVEN MORE SO IN A SECOND MEETING I HAD WITH BAYULKEN ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT FARTHER IN THE DAY) THE FORMAN'S PERSONAL BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE ARABS BECAME INCREASINGLY EVIDENT, IN CONTRAST WITH HIS PUBLIC POLICY OF NEUTRALITY.

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**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ROME 11309 171711Z

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44  
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 INRE-00 1031 W

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O R 171600Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1378  
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
AMCONSUL DHARHAN

ANDERSON  
HOLDRIDGE  
HORMATS  
JORDEN  
KENNEDY  
LEHMAN  
LEVINE  
NEGROPONTE  
ODEEN  
RATLIPF  
RONDON  
SAUNDERS  
SONNENFELD  
V.I.G.  
WALSH

SECRET ROME 11309

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DEPT PASS USINT ALGIERS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: ENRG PFUR SA XF  
SUBJECT: SAUDI WARNING TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY  
REF: JIDDA 4548

1. ON OCTOBER 17 RESPONSIBLE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL CONFIRMED TO US SAUDI DEMARCHE TO EC AMBASSADORS IN JIDDA WARNING THAT SAUDIS MAY HAVE TO DECREASE OIL PRODUCTION UNLESS EC PUTS EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON US TO CHANGE ITS POLICY TOWARD PRESENT CONFLICT. OFFICIAL REMARKED THAT ITALIANS AND OTHER EUROPEANS WOULD FEEL THREATENED PRODUCTION DECREASE

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PAGE 02 ROME 11309 171711Z

BEFORE US. HE SAID MINISTRY WAS STUDYING REPLY TO SAUDI  
DEMARCHE.

2. DEPARTMENT AWARE OF EXTREME ITALIAN NERVOUSNESS THAT  
MID-EAST CONFLICT COULD THREATEN ITALIAN OIL SUPPLY AND THAT  
ITALY ONE OF MOST VULNERABLE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THIS REGARD.  
WE SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE  
US GUIDANCE ON SUBJECT THAT WE CAN USE WITH ITALIANS BEFORE  
THEY REPLY TO SAUDIS. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. VOLPE

NOTE BY DC/T: NOT PASSED USINT ALGIERS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 578

1130 17 TEL AV 98263 171545Z

AMEMBASSY AFA-12

INFO OCT-73 FUR-25 TO-14 180-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00

ISSS-00 INRE-00 USTE-00 CIAF-00 DUDE-00 PM-07 H-03

MP-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-27 ACDA-19 A-01 OPR-02 SY-10 OC-06 DRC-01 /153 W

\*\*\*\*\* 129458

171258Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0152

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CATRO PRIORITY

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

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CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 8263

1. KNESSET OCTOBER 16 ADOPTED RESOLUTION EXPRESSING SPECIAL APPRECIATION TO US PEOPLE, ITS PRESIDENT AND ITS CONGRESS, COMMENDING AID AND SOLIDARITY OF WORLD JEWRY, AND CONDEMNING BRITAIN AND FRANCE FOR DENYING ISRAEL VITAL SUPPLIES IN WAR SITUATION. SESSION WAS DEDICATED TO MRS. MEIR'S ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY SPEECHES BY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTIES REVEALING CONSENSUS, EXCEPT FOR 3 MEMBER RAKAH (PRO-MOSCOW CP COMPOSED largely of ISRAELI ARABS), THAT ARAB WAR AIM WAS DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL RATHER THAN MERELY RE-ACQUISITION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

2. MRS. MEIR'S SPEECH COUPLED WITH ARRIVAL OF US MILITARY TO HAS REINFORCED GOVERNMENT'S CREDIBILITY IN ALL SECTORS. PUBLIC SEEKS TO STAND BEHIND GOI DETERMINATION TO PROSECUTE

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE NO TEL AV 08263 171545Z

1. WAR FURTHER, SEEKS RESIGNED TO FACT THAT WAR WILL CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME AND HAS ACCEPTED REALITY THAT CURRENT SITUATION IS RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF 1967. ISRAELI PUBLIC DOES NOT INTERPRET SADAT'S SPEECH AS BROACHING ANY PROSPECT OF CEASING FIRE OR PEACE.

2. ECONOMY CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AT REDUCED BUT SATISFACTORY LEVELS. MAJOR PROBLEM IS INTERNAL TRANSPORT. AT PRESENT THERE IS NO SERIOUS MANPOWER PROBLEM IN EITHER INDUSTRY OR AGRICULTURE. THERE ARE MORE VOLUNTEERS THAN JOBS WITH HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND WOMEN FILLING IN FOR MEN AT THE FRONT.

3. SECURITY SITUATION IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ACCORDING TO ISRAELI SECURITY AUTHORITIES REMAINS QUIET, BUT UNDERCURRENTS OF UNREST HAVE DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF US MILITARY RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL (TERUSALEM 1147).

4. LOD AIRPORT HAS REMAINED BUSY. EL AL HAD EIGHT INCOMING AND NINE OUTGOING FLIGHTS OCTOBER 16 AND PROJECTS ST INCOMING AND THREE OUTGOING FLIGHTS TODAY. AIR FRANCE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SUSPENDED OPERATIONS INTO LOD.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 T0-14 ISO-00 EURF-00 NEA-10 CIAE-00 DDE-00  
PH-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAF-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01  
PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 SAJ-01 NC-01  
DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /149 W

129662

① 171557Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7899  
INFO USMISSION EC BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
USMISSION USIN NEW YORK PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL COPENHAGEN 2582

E.O. 11652 GOS  
TAGS: PFOR, UR, DA, XF, XX  
SUBJ: BREZHNEV AND DANISH PRIME MINISTER DISCUSS  
MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF: MOSCOW 12798

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM MOSCOW THE MIDDLE EAST  
CONFLICT WAS PRINCIPAL SUBJECT DISCUSSED DURING ANKER JORGENSEN'S  
THREE-HOUR TALK WITH PARTY SECRETARY BREZHNEV OCTOBER 16. END SUM-  
MARY.

1. ACCORDING TO EXTENSIVE PRESS COVERAGE AVAILABLE HERE PRIMIN  
ANKER JORGENSEN'S THREE-HOUR TALK WITH BREZHNEV OCTOBER 16  
(TALK WAS SCHEDULED TO LAST LESS THAN ONE HOUR) DEALT HEAVILY WITH  
MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.  
PRESS REPORTS STATE THAT ANKER JORGENSEN OFFERED DANISH GOOD OFFICES  
IF THESE MIGHT BE OF ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING CONFLICT TO AN EARLY  
END. DANISH OFFER REPORTEDLY MADE IN RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV'S  
COMMENT THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

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LIES NOT ONLY WITH THE GREAT POWERS BUT ALSO WITH SMALL COUNTRIES.

2. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST, WHICH WERE NOT WITHHELD FROM PRESS, AS KOSYGIN'S REMARKS OCTOBER 15 HAD BEEN (SEF REFTEL), WERE SUMMARIZED IN FOLLOWING THREE POINTS: (A) HE ASSURED DANISH PRIMIN THAT SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO RECOGNIZE ITS CO-RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI STATE AND THEREFORE IT ACKNOWLEDGES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO CONTINUED SECURE EXISTENCE AS A STATE; (B) AN EARLY CESSATION OF THE WAR NECESSARY BECAUSE OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BECOME INVOLVED, SO THAT IT WOULD DEVELOP INTO A LARGER AND UNCONTROLLABLE CONFLICT; (C) ONE OF MOST DANGEROUS POSSIBILITIES WAS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT COULD DEVELOP IN SUCH A DIRECTION THAT IT WOULD DAMAGE THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE BETWEEN THE U.S AND THE SOVIET UNION.

3. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT BREZHNEV WAS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS AND PRECISE IN HIS STATEMENTS REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE U.S. HE REPORTEDLY MADE NO CIRUITOUS COMMENTS ON U.S. POLICY, NOT EVEN IN CONNECTION WITH MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. HE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF A METHODICAL EXPANSION OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S; ADDING THAT HE ANTICIPATED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD VISIT MOSCOW IN THE COURSE OF 1974.

4. SAME PRESS SOURCES DOWN-PLAYED SIGNIFICANCE OF ABRUPT CANCELLATION OF JORGENSEN'S MEETINGS WITH KOSYGIN, STATING THAT CANCELLATION WAS UNOFFICIALLY EXPLAINED TO PRESS AS DUE TO AN UNEXPECTED VISIT IN MOSCOW OCTOBER 16 BY IRAQ'S PRESIDENT EL-BAKR. THIS UNOFFICIAL EXPLANATION INDICATED THAT EL-BAKR VISIT CONNECTED WITH ARAB REQUEST FOR MIG 23 TYPE AIRCRAFT AND APPARENTLY INCLUDED ASSURANCES THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ONLY MIG 21 TYPE AIRCRAFT.

5. DANISH FONOFF OFFICIAL BACKSTOPPING JORGENSEN'S VISIT, TOLD EMBOFF THAT NO OFFICIAL REPORT OF PRIMIN'S TALK WITH BREZHNEV RECEIVED AS YET IN COPENHAGEN.

6. COMMENT: JORGENSEN'S AND BREZHNEV'S STATEMENTS WERE APPARENTLY ONLY GENERAL EXPRESSIONS OF GOOD WILL. IF ANY SPECIFIC SOVIET DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD BEEN INTENDED, FONOFF WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD REPORT BY THIS

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TIME, IN VIEW OF EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING IN COPENHAGEN OCT  
17.  
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ORIGIN AF-18

TUN.

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-10 IO-14 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00  
TNRE-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 EUR-25 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07  
H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01  
SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 /149 R

DRAFTED BY AF/N:JJBLAKE:EW  
APPROVED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY  
S/S-O:RELTZ  
NEA:MR. ATHERTON  
AF:AMB. ROSS  
S/S-MR. GAMMON

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P 171741Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

SECRET STATE 205715

F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, TS, US  
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA

REF: STATE 203676

1. IN PRESENTING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA TO PRESIDENT NIXON (REFTEL) EL-GOULLI TOLD DEPUTY SECRETARY THE ARABS DID NOT REGARD THEMSELVES AS AGGRESSORS INASMUCH AS THEY HAD WAITED SIX YEARS TO RECOVER PEACEFULLY TERRITORIES LOST IN 1967 AND WERE NOW FIGHTING FOR THEIR OWN LAND. ACCORDING TO EL-GOULLI "EVEN THE EUROPEANS UNDERSTAND THIS." EL-GOULLI STATED GOT KNOWS US IS NOT AN ENEMY, BUT ASKED WHETHER US COULD SAY PUBLICLY TO ISRAEL THAT LATTER CANNOT LIVE BY WAR AND SHOULD GIVE UP OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. DEPUTY SECRETARY ASSURED EL-GOULLI THAT US CONTINUES TO WORK TOWARD PERMANENT PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST.

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 42 STATE 245715

MEANTIME, HOWEVER, IT CANNOT SIT BACK AND LET SOVIET EQUIPMENT CRUSH ISRAEL.

2. EL-GOULLT STATED PROBLEM WITH PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT ARABS, HAVING ACHIEVED MILITARY SUCCESSES, WILL FEEL MORE CONFIDENT TO START ANOTHER WAR IN MIDDLE EAST FIVE TO TEN YEARS FROM NOW UNLESS PERMANENT AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION IS REACHED IN AREA. HE SUGGESTED US SHOULD TELL RUSSIANS TO TELL ARABS THAT THEY HAVE RECOVERED PRESTIGE THEY LOST IN 1967 AND THAT THEY SHOULD WITHDRAW TO 1967 LINES (EL-GOULLI APPEARED TO BELIEVE ARABS WOULD SUCCEED IN PUSHING MILITARY GAINS PAST 1967 LINES.) AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED WITH COMMENT THAT NO RPT NO CEASE FIRE WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY ARABS IN ABSENCE OF ASSURANCE REGARDING WHAT WOULD FOLLOW. DEPUTY SECRETARY ASSURED EL-GOULLT USG WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF PRESENT CRISIS. KISSINGER

SECRET



War

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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CAIRO 6316N 171420Z

TO  
ACTION NFA-12

INFO OCT-81 TSD-00 C1AE-00 D00F-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-04  
RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 PM-07 NSC-10 SS-20 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
RCD-01 TNRE-00 USSS-00 Y0-14 SCEM-02 SCI-06 OMB-01  
TRSE-00 ER-11 DRC-04 ACDA-19 OPR-02 SY-10 /135 W  
171320Z OCT 73 128887

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TO USINT CAIRO  
1. USIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4048

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CAIRO 3160

USINT

FJ 11052: N/A  
TAGS: PFOR MOPS EG TS  
SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REACTION OCTOBER 17

1. SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE  
PRESIDENT SADAT'S OCTOBER 16 "OPEN LETTER TO  
MR. NIXON" PEACE INITIATIVE MONOPOLIZED FRONT PAGE  
BANNERHEADS IN ALL CAIRO DAILIES.

ONE OF AL-AHRAM'S NINE BANNERHEADS READ . . .  
"PRESIDENT SADAT DECLARES PEACE PROJECT WITH FIVE  
SPECIFIC POINTS IN OPEN LETTER TO NIXON."

IN AL-AKRIBAR, ONE OF SIX BANNERHEADS READ . . .  
"US THREAT DOES NOT FRIGHTEN US--HERE ARE OUR PEACE  
CONDITIONS."

IN AL-SUMHOURTYA . . . "EGYPTIAN PEACE PROJECT IN OPEN  
LETTER TO NIXON" WAS AMONG EIGHT BANNERHEADS.

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3-2



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Page 42 CAIRO 43164 171425Z

1. AL-AHRAM

REGARDING U.S. REACTION TO SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE, AL-AHRAM PUBLISHED LOWER RIGHT FRONT PAGE REUTER REPORT FROM WASHINGTON STATING "AT FIRST GLANCE, U.S. OFFICIALS APPLAUDED SADAT'S PROPOSAL TO HOLD UN CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE-EAST PEACE." TWO-COLUMN REPORT SAID OFFICIALS WANTED TIME TO STUDY SADAT'S PROPOSAL. ALSO ON LOWER FRONT PAGE, AL-AHRAM PUBLISHED OSLO WIRE SERVICE STORY OF PEACE PRIZE FOR KISSINGER AND THO.

U.S. AVIV WIRE SERVICE REPORT MADE LEAD FOREIGN PAGE STORY UNDER FIVE-COLUMN HEADLINE: "VOLUME OF U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL DEPENDS ON ITS NEEDS." TWO-COLUMN REPORT SUPPLEMENTING LEAD STORY COVERED DISPATCH OF 2,000 MARINES TO SIXTH FLEET.

IN AL-AHRAM EDITORIAL SAID U.S. WILL BE MISTAKEN IF IT BELIEVES THAT DETENTE MEANS IMPOSING ISRAEL'S POSITION AS BASIS FOR ME SETTLEMENT. HATEM SADEQ, IN ANOTHER EDITORIAL, SAID SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE FILED U.S.-ISRAELI POLITICAL INITIATIVE. IN THIRD EDITORIAL, DR. ADIB EL-GADIR SUGGESTED: NATIONALIZING U.S. SHARES IN OIL COMPANIES OPERATING IN ARAB WORLD; SELLING NO CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS OR REFINED PRODUCTS TO U.S.; SELLING OIL TO EUROPE AND JAPAN IN RETURN FOR HARD CURRENCIES OTHER THAN DOLLARS AND SELLING OIL TO SOCIALIST AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ON EASIER AND EASY CREDIT TERMS.

2. AL-AKHBAR

AL-AKHBAR PUBLISHED TWO COLUMN FRONT PAGE WASHINGTON WIRE SERVICE ITEM SAYING "U.S. ALLEGES IT IS MERELY COMPENSATING ISRAELI WAR LOSSES ... EVERY MINUTE U.S. PLANE CARRIES ARMS TO ISRAEL." AL-AKHBAR IN ONE-COLUMN FRONT PAGE STORY CARRIED ITEMS ABOUT U.S. MARINES BEING DISPATCHED TO SIXTH FLEET; SENATOR MANSFIELD'S SUGGESTION TO HOLD SIX-PARTY ME CONFERENCE AND STORY CITING SENATOR FULBRIGHT AS SAYING ISRAEL "ERRED DURING PAST SIX YEARS BY NOT CONCLUDING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT."

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 43 CAIRO 0316Z 171420Z

JERUSALEM WIRE SERVICE REPORT ON LOWER FRONT PAGE  
NOTED MRS. METI IN KNESSET ADDRESS AS SAYING  
U.S. AID TO ISRAEL SERVES ITS "SELF INTEREST." WASHING-  
TON'S WELCOME OF SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE WAS REPORTED  
ON LOWER FRONT PAGE ONE-COLUMN REUTER REPORT.

AL-AKHBAR CAPPED ITS EXTREME LEFT FOREIGN PAGE  
COLUMN WITH OSLO WIRE SERVICE STORY HEADLINED ..."NOBEL  
PRIZE AWARDED TO KISSINGER WHILE U.S. INTERVENES  
MILITARILY TO KILL PEACE."

EDITORIALIZING ON AL-AKHBAR'S BACK PAGE, ABDEL  
IZTS KHAMIS CRITICIZED U.S. AND EUROPEAN VOLUNTEERS  
SUPPORTING "ZIONIST AGGRESSION," AND MOHAMED ZAKI  
ABDEL QADER EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT U.S., WHICH WAS  
FIGHTING INCREASINGLY IN CREATING UN AND SAFEGUARDING ITS CHARTER,  
IS NOW SUPPORTING ISRAEL WITH ARMS AND TROOPS.

4. AL-GOMHOURYA

LEAD FOREIGN PAGE STORY IN AL-GOMHOURYA DEALT  
WITH "FURY AROUND ARAB WORLD BECAUSE OF U.S. INTERVEN-  
TION." FOREIGN PAGE'S SECOND LEAD STORY QUOTED WASH-  
INGTON WIRE SERVICES ON U.S. ARMS RESUPPLIES TO ISRAEL.

SCATTERED ONE-COLUMN FOREIGN PAGE ITEMS COVERED FULL-  
BRIGHT WARNING AGAINST "REPEATING VIETNAM ERROR IN  
MIDEAST" ... TIGHTENING SECURITY OF U.S. EMBASSY IN  
RABAT. .. PRICES DROP ON NEW YORK STOCK MARKET ... EGYPT'S  
COMPLAINT AGAINST ISRAEL'S USE OF "AMERICAN-MADE, ANTI-  
CIVILIAN" BOMBS... U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL "SUPERVISING"  
UNLOADING ARMS RESUPPLIES, KISSINGER AND THO, NOBEL  
PRIZE WINNERS, WERE COVERED IN BRIEF AFP ITEM FROM  
OSLO. AL-GOMHOURYA COMMENTED: "WE BELIEVE PEACE  
CANNOT BE DIVIDED... KISSINGER'S CONDUCT AND STATEMENTS  
CONCERNING ARAB LIBERATION... DO NOT INDICATE HE WORKS  
FOR PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE."

5. COMMENTS:

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
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PAGE 24 CAIRO 03160 171425Z

THE EGYPTIAN PRESS TODAY SEEMS TO BE TAKING "HABIT AND SEE" POSTURE TOWARD U.S. AND ITS RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. PRESS HAS PICKED UP MOST AVAILABLE INTERNATIONAL WIRE-SERVICE STORIES THAT CAST U.S. IN BAD LIGHT FROM EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW BUT, AS YET, THERE HAVE BEEN VERY FEW ORIGINAL EDITORIALS THAT HAVE ATTACKED U.S. POLICY OR ACTIONS AND THOSE FEW HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY MODERATE AND REASONED.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

War

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3

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05548 171327Z

45  
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00 1031 W

Z 0 171300Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9757  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE  
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECRET AMMAN 5548

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: MOPS JO, SY, IS  
SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING ON BATTLE IN SYRIA

128315  
ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V.I.G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

010

1. KING SAID 1400 LOCAL THAT LATEST REPORTS FROM COMMANDER IN FRONT SHOWED LOSSES IN BATTLE YESTERDAY WERE LIGHTER THAN FIRST REPORTS HAD INDICATED. JORDANIANS LOST 9 TANKS AND 2 APCS PLUS DOZEN OR MORE REPARABLE TANKS WHICH HAVE BEEN RECOVERED. FOUR WERE KILLED, 29 WOUNDED, AND 10 MISSING. JORDANIANS ALLEGEDLY HIT 10 TANKS AND KNOCKED ABOUT BADLY AN APC COMPANY AND 2 ANTI-TANK COMPANIES.

2. BATTLE WAS BADLY PLANNED AND IMPLEMENTED. IRAQIS WERE SUPPOSED TO ADVANCE WITH A BRIGADE BUT ONLY A BATTALION TOOK PART. AFTER JORDANIANS ADVANCED AND THEN FOUND THEMSELVES VIRTUALLY ALONE, THEY STARTED BACK TO REGROUP. SYRIAN FORCE CROSSED LINES AND FOUGHT IRAQI BATTALION FOR SOME TIME WITH UNKNOWN LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES AND SOME CASUALTIES TO JORDANIANS.

3. KING SAID THAT ALL THE TROUBLE IN AREA SEEMS TO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05548 171327Z

BE CAUSED BY SMALL ISRAELI COMBAT UNIT OF 59 TANKS, APC'S, AND TOW MISSILE COMPANIES. DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SEE WHY SYRIANS AND IRAQIS HAVE HAD SO MUCH TROUBLE WITH THIS UNIT BUT IT IS PROBABLY BAD PLANNING AND EXECUTION.

4. IN BATTLE JORDANIANS HAD SUPPORT AND COMBAT COMMAND OF SYRIAN AT BATTALION AND TWO SYRIAN AIRCRAFT. ALL DID WELL.

5. KING IS SEEING MOROCCAN GENERAL DLIMI RIGHT NOW. PRELIMINARY REPORTS FROM DLIMI REVEAL SEVERAL INTERESTING FACTS. DLIMI SAYS THAT SENIOR SOVIET OFFICERS ARE SERVING IN SYRIAN HEADQUARTERS. HE ALSO SAW NORTH KOREAN AND NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICERS AND SAID THEY ARE WORKING WITH AIR DEFENSE. THEY PUT ALL THEIR FORCES ON THE LINE, LEAVING NO MANEUVERABLE RESERVE. WHEN THERE IS A BREAKTHROUGH, THERE IS NO WAY TO CONTAIN. HE CALLED IT TYPICAL SOVIET ATTACK FORMATION.

6. DLIMI SAID MOROCCANS HAD TAKEN CONSIDERABLE LOSSES, INCLUDING ALL THEIR HEAVY EQUIPMENT. THERE IS STILL ONE POCKET OF MOROCCAN FORCES HOLDING OUT IN GOLAN.

5  
7. TLAS HAS SAID IF HE COULD GET ANOTHER JORDANIAN BRIGADE HE COULD DISPERSE WITH THE FOUR IRAQI BRIGADES. HE IS SUSPICIOUS THAT IRAQI INTENTIONS IN SYRIA ARE POLITICAL AND NOT MILITARY.

8. KING WILL REPLACE LOST/DAMAGED EQUIPMENT AND MEN. THIS IS BEING OR ALREADY HAS BEEN DONE.  
BROWN

ADVIS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

*War*

CONFIDENTIAL 669 (3)

PAGE 01 MADRID 05951 171618Z 3

51  
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 NODE-00 CCO-00  
NSAE-00 INRE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

O R 171628Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6960  
INFO USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE  
CINCEUR IMMEDIATE  
16TH AF  
JUSMG-MAAG

CONFIDENTIAL MADRID 5951  
EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MARR PFUR SP XF  
SUBJ: USE OF SPANISH BASES IN MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF: MADRID 5933

129836

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
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SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V.I.G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

D/B

IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN MINISTER'S INQUIRIES DURING  
OCTOBER 16 INTERVIEW (REFTEL), I HAVE TODAY SENT HIM  
THE FOLLOWING LETTER REGARDING TANKERS AND F-4  
AIRCRAFT AT TORREJON. EXPLANATION OF UNUSUAL  
MARKINGS OF F-4S DIFFERS SOMEWHAT FROM THAT PROPOSED  
PARA 9(C) OF REFTEL IN LIGHT OF MORE RECENT INFORMATION. TEXT  
OF LETTER AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT. I HAVE LOOKED INTO THE DEVELOPMENTS AT  
TORREJON AIR BASE WHICH YOU BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION  
IN OUR CONVERSATION OF OCTOBER 16 AND I BELIEVE THERE  
IS NO QUESTION THAT THESE ACTIVITIES ARE ROUTINE IN  
NATURE AND ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR PAST PRACTICES,  
WITH THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND WITH  
ALL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.

THE NUMBER OF TANKER AIRCRAFT NOW TEMPORARILY STATIONED  
AT TORREJON, WHICH YOU STATED WAS 22, AND WHICH CAN CHANGE  
FROM DAY TO DAY, IS NOT ABNORMAL. DURING THE PAST 12

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

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MONTHS THE NUMBER OF KC-135 TANKERS AT TORREJON HAS FLUCTUATED CONSIDERABLY, HAVING BEEN ON SOME OCCASIONS AS LOW AS 10 AND ON OTHER OCCASIONS AS HIGH AS 30. THESE FLUCTUATIONS IN THE NUMBER OF TANKERS HAVE CUSTOMARILY RESULTED FROM SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AS TRAINING SCHEDULES, CREW ROTATIONS, AND REGULAR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

THE KC-135 TANKER AIRCRAFT HAS AN EXCELLENT SAFETY RECORD THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IT IS FULLY CAPABLE OF A SAFE TAKEOFF WHEN LOADED EVEN IF ONE ENGINE SHOULD FAIL. THIS PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY HAS BEEN PROVEN BY ACTUAL FLIGHT TEST DATA. MOREOVER, THE FLIGHT PATHS CUSTOMARILY USED BY KC-135 TANKERS IN ARRIVING OR DEPARTING TORREJON AIR BASE DO NOT TAKE THE AIRCRAFT OVER HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS OF EITHER MADRID OR THOSE COMMUNITIES SURROUNDING THE BASE.

THE TWO F-4 PHANTOM AIRCRAFT OBSERVED AT TORREJON BEARING PAINT AND MARKINGS DISTINCT FROM THOSE NORMALLY USED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE ARE PART OF A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF THIS TYPE AIRCRAFT THAT IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE BEEN DELIVERED BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN UNDER AN ONGOING MILITARY SALES PROGRAM. AT THE REQUEST OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SUCH AIRCRAFT ARE PAINTED IN THE DESERT CAMOUFLAGE COLORS RATHER THAN THE CAMOUFLAGE MOTTI USED BY U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THOSE AIRCRAFT, WHICH HAVE NOW DEPARTED FOR IRAN, WOULD HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY BORE SMALL UNITED STATES AIR FORCE MARKINGS. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BEAR THESE MARKINGS UNTIL THEY ARE DELIVERED TO IRAN AND GIVEN NEW IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS BY THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES. ALL SUCH DELIVERIES OF F-4 AIRCRAFT THROUGH TORREJON AIR BASE ARE SUBJECT TO NORMAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AND CLEARANCES BY SPANISH AND U.S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

I APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY FOR YOU QUESTIONS THAT POTENTIALLY MAY LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT OUR USE OF THE BASES. I AM, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO PROVIDE PROMPT CLARIFICATION REGARDING OTHER ASPECTS OF AMERICAN ACTIVITIES AT SPANISH BASES THAT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION. END TEXT.  
RIVERO

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. WRIGHT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONTROL: 4846Q  
RECD: 17 OCT, 5:33PM

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FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1934  
BT  
SECRET OTTAWA 2490

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NODIS

DEPT MAY WISH PASS INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS AND USMISSION NATO

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO  
SUBJECT: CANADA AND NATO IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF: STATE 204887 AND 203685

1. I MET WITH ACTING PRIMIN AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MITCHELL SHARP AT 12:30 P.M., OCTOBER 17, 1973 TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT POSES FOR NATO IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE 204887. I ALSO DREW ON PARAS 2 THROUGH 5 AND 9 OF STATE 203685.

2. IN SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF GOC, I NOTED THAT IN COMMONS ON OCTOBER 15, THE MINISTER HAD SAID THAT CANADA'S POLICY BEGINS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE STATE OF ISRAEL WHICH CANADA HELPED TO BRING INTO EXISTENCE AND WHOSE MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS CANADA SUPPORTED, HAS THE RIGHT TO EXIST JUST LIKE ANY OTHER STATE IN THE WORLD. I STATED THAT IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE US HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET REARMING EFFORT DOES NOT UPSET THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I SAID WE HOPED THAT THE GOC WOULD HELP TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION (BOTH DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY BY URGING OUR NATO ALLIES TO DO LIKEWISE) THAT DETENTE IS A TWO-WAY STREET.

3. MINISTER SHARP DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT HE HAD MADE IN COMMONS LAST NIGHT (OCTOBER 16) DURING A GENERAL DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST (SEPTEL) AND READ FROM HIS TEXT THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT:

"WHILE THE WAR IS GOING ON, OTHERS HAVE GROWING RESPONSIBILITIES AND CAN EITHER PROLONG HOSTILITIES OR EXERT GREAT INFLUENCE IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE. THE MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF ARMS TO BOTH SIDES OBVIOUSLY CAN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

- 2 - OTTAWA 2490, 17 OCT '73

EXERT A MODERATING OR STIMULATING INFLUENCE. THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE, DR. KISSINGER, IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, ISSUED A CALL FOR MODERATION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY IN THE MATTER OF SUPPLYING ARMS. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED SUPPLYING ARMS SINCE THIS APPAL WAS MADE, AND OF COURSE WE NOW HAVE THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE US IN ITS TURN HAS ALSO FELT COMPELLED TO DO SO."

4. MINISTER SHARP THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS;

A. ONE OF THE QUESTIONS ARISING IN HIS MIND AS WELL AS IN THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHO ARE TRYING TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES IS WHETHER THE US AND THE USSR HAD A PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST. DID THE US HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE USSR? THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION REMAINS UNANSWERED.

B. AGREED THAT THE PRESENT CONFLICT IS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER AND THAT EAST-WEST DETENTE IS INVOLVED.

C. WELL FOR NATO TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER MUCH MORE THOROUGHLY THAT IT HAS UP TO NOW. AT THE MANY NATO MEETINGS HE HAS ATTENDED IN THE PAST, THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ONLY CONSIDERED IN A PERIPHERAL WAY.

5. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, SHARP SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT NATO COULD COME UP WITH A CONSENSUS POSITION ON THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. BUT HE SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE READILY ACCEPTED BY ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE THAT THEIR DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE HAD BEEN TIED TO THE MIDDLE EAST. IN HIS VIEW "WE WERE PURSUING DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN ORDER TO REDUCE TENSION IN EUROPE" AND TO IMPROVE THE POSITION OF THE WEST VIZ-A-VIZ THE SOVIET UNION. HE REALIZED THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (AND IN ASIA AS WELL) HAD AN EFFECT ON DETENTE BUT "WE HAD CONCENTRATED IN EUROPE" OUT OF WHICH CAME THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) AND THE TALKS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE (MBFR).

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

- 3 - OTTAWA 2490, 17 OCT '73

6. MINISTER SHARP SAID THE POSITION I HAD OUTLINED AS WELL AS THAT PRESENTED IN NATO ON OCTOBER 16 "MAY NOT BE READILY ACCEPTED BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE." HE SAID THE MATTER "NEEDS CLARIFICATION" AND A "FULL AIRING" IN NATO. WITHOUT ELABORATION, SHARP SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT FROM THE CANADIAN MISSION TO NATO OF AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT WHICH HAD "CAUSED US SOME CONCERN." FOR THIS REASON HE APPRECIATED RECEIVING FROM ME THIS STATEMENT OF THE US POSITION. HE SAID THAT, AFTER REFLECTION, HE WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON OUR EXPOSITION.

7. SHARP NOTED THAT HE REPRESENTS A RIDING (DISTRICT) IN PARLIAMENT WHICH IS 40 PERCENT JEWISH AND HE IS THEREFORE SENSITIVE TO THE ISRAELI POSITION. HE DESCRIBED CANADA AS PRO-ISRAEL BUT NOT ANTI-ARAB.

COMMENT: WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING IN GENERAL A PARALLEL POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE MINISTER CAREFULLY AND CAUTIOUSLY AVOIDED AT THIS TIME CONCURRING WITH OUR POSITION AS OUTLINED HERE OR AT NATO. HIS EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR A FULL DEBATE IN NATO AND HIS ALLUSION TO A US-USSR SECRET AGREEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST SUGGESTS THAT PERHAPS CANADA AND OTHER NATO ALLIES DO NOT BELIEVE WE HAVE IN THE PAST KEPT THEM FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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CONTROL: 4 6 7 8Q  
RECD: 17 OCT, 1236PM

P 171358Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8111  
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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, GW, EG, IS, XF  
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

REF: STATE 204887

1. EMBOFF PRESENTED DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS  
CONTAINED REFTEL TO FRG FONOFF'S NATO DIVISION CHIEF  
OCTOBER 17. LATTER LISTENED SYMPATHETICALLY TO PRE-  
SENTATION AND NOTED FONMIN SCHEEL'S GENERALLY POSITIVE  
APPROACH TO US POSITION THE PREVIOUS DAY (BONN 15007).

2. AS TO SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION WHICH THE US HAD  
PRESENTED IN NATO OCTOBER 16, HE SAID THESE  
WOULD BE RECEIVING URGENT CONSIDERATION IN FEDERAL  
GOVERNMENT. HE NOTED DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED FOR FONOFF  
IN UNDERTAKING IMMEDIATE ACTION SINCE MOST SENIOR  
OFFICIALS ARE EITHER OFF ON OFFICIAL VISITS TR, LIKE  
FONMIN SCHEEL WHO IS LEAVING FOR WARSAW OCTOBER 18 ON  
3-DAY VISIT, ARE ABOUT TO DEPART BONN ON SUCH VISITS.  
HILLENBAND

SECRET  
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PAGE 1. USUN N 04008 180016Z

66  
ACTION 1-14

INFO 1-14 AF=10 ARA=16 EA=11 EUR=25 NEA=10 RSC=01 ISO=00  
1-14 DODE=00 PM=07 H=03 INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10  
1-14 PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=20 USIA=15 ACDA=19 NSCE=00

SSD=00 INRE=00 DRC=01 /184 W  
\*\*\*\*\* 003843

REBAN OCT 73  
FROM USUN NY  
TO SECRETARY WASHDC 0287  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY KABOUDABO  
USIA NAIROBI  
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM

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E.O. 14176 N/A  
TAGS: PRR UN XF  
SUBJ: EBAN'S REMARKS ON ME

FOLLOWING ARE VOA REP'S NOTES ON PART OF ISRAELI  
PONMEN EBRA EBAN'S REMARKS TO UN CORRESPONDENTS ASSOCIATION  
AT LUNCHEON OCT 178

QUOTE: EGYPT AND SYRIA HAD AN ALTERNATIVE TO BEGIN  
SHOOTING AT ISRAEL ON OCT 6. HAVING MAINTAINED AND RESPECTED  
THE CEASEFIRE FOR MANY YEARS, THEY COULD HAVE CONTINUED TO  
RESPECT IT FOR ANOTHER FEW WEEKS. THERE WAS A CONCRETE  
NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITY OPEN TO THE EGYPTIAN GOVT JUST AS  
WELL AS THE ISRAELI GOVT. IN THE WEEK PRECEDING THIS RECOURSE  
(THE SHOOTING) TO MASSIVE VIOLENCE, IT WAS SUGGESTED TO EACH

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PAGE 02 07 NOV 1984 008 180016Z

OF US BY SECY KISSINGER THAT AT A CERTAIN DATE IN NOVEMBER--  
THAT IS TO SAY AFTER WHAT WAS PLANNED TO BE ISRAELI'S  
ELECTION--WE SHOULD FIND OURSELVES HERE AGAIN IN THIS  
CITY IN ORDER TO DISCUSS WITH HIM HOW TO PRODUCE A COURSE  
OF PROCESSION--SOME SITUATION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO  
ACCOMMODATION AND TO NEGOTIATION.

IN DESCRIBING THE IDEA, I DON'T WANT TO GO BEYOND  
WHAT THE SECRETARY (KISSINGER) PUBLICLY SAID. THE IDEA WAS  
NOT TO GET ISRAEL AND EGYPT DISCUSSING AMERICAN PLANS OR  
ANYBODY ELSE'S PLANS BUT TO CREATE A CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY  
WOULD FIND THEMSELVES EXCHANGING IDEAS, PLANS OR PROPOSALS  
WITH EACH OTHER. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO ASSUMPTION THEN  
THAT THE INITIATIVE WAS REJECTED. THERE WAS NO SUCH  
INDICATION. THERE WAS SOME INDICATION BEFORE AND DURING  
OUR TALKS THAT EGYPT WAS INTERESTED, WHATEVER IT MIGHT  
THINK ABOUT THE US IN TERMS OF AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS.  
I BELIEVE EGYPT MAY BELIEVE THAT IS THE REAL FOCUS AT WHICH  
SOME KIND OF EVOLUTION COULD COME IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE  
NATURE OF AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. I BELIEVE THEY FELT  
THAT SECY KISSINGER WAS NOT WITHOUT EXPERIENCE AND SOME  
ACHIEVEMENTS IN CREATING CONDITIONS OF DIALOGUE IN CONFLICTS  
WHERE THERE HAD BEEN COMPLETE ABSENCE OF DIALOGUE BEFORE.

THIS WAS THE GENERAL IMPACT OF WHAT WAS SAID IN THEIR  
PRESENCE AND WHAT THEY SAID TO OTHER DELEGATIONS. THEREFORE,  
THERE WAS A PROSPECT THAT IN NOVEMBER--I DON'T SAY THAT WE  
WOULD BE TALKING WITHOUT A PEACE TREATY--BUT THAT WE WOULD  
SERIOUSLY BE TALKING ABOUT HOW TO GET A NEGOTIATING PROCESS  
GOING. THAT WAS THE ATMOSPHERE ON THE 5TH OF OCTOBER AND  
ONE CANNOT THEREFORE IGNORE THE FACT THAT THEY HAD THE  
OPPORTUNITY TO TALK AND THEY CHOSE TO SHOOT. UNQUOTE.  
BENNETT

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55  
ACTION ID-14

INFO OCT=01 EUR=25 EA=11 NEA=11 TSO=00 CIAE=00 DUDE=00  
PM=07 H=03 INR=10 L=03 NSAF=00 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01  
PKS=01 ~~SPC=03~~ SS=20 USIA=15 ALDA=19 SSO=00 NSCE=00  
INRE=00 AF=10 DRC=01 A168 003885

P R 172324Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 266  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 4007

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOX XF, UN  
SUBJ: EBAN STATEMENT TO WEO GROUP

SUMMARY: AT HIS REQUEST, EBAN ADDRESSED WEO GROUP OCT 17 AT CANADIAN MISSION. (ZAYYAT HAD ALSO BEEN INVITED, BUT HAD DECLINED, HAVING SPOKEN TO EC NINE PREVIOUS DAY.) EBAN DESCRIBED PRESENT STATUS OF ME CONFLICT AND SET FORTH ISRAELI DESIDERATA FOR STEELEMENT. IN BRIEF, ISRAEL WISHES CEASEFIRE ON PRESENT COMBAT LINES OR ON OCT 5 BOUNDARIES, WHILE RECOGNIZING EGYPT IS NOT YET READY TO ACCEPT EITHER RETURN TO PRE-JUNE 1967 LINES, TYING CEASEFIRE TO TERMS OF FINAL SETTLEMENT, OR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN ANY FORM OTHER THAN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES UNDER SYMBOLIC UN AUSPICES ALL OUT OF QUESTION. SELF-

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CONFIDENT AND ARTICULATE AS EVER, EBAN GAVE NOT SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO BEND ON FUNDAMENTAL ARAB DEMANDS. END SUMMARY.

1. EBAN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS GROUP WHOSE AFFINITIES WITH ISRAEL HE FELT WERE FAR GREATER THAN HIS DIVERGENCES. HE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT AT THIS CRUCIAL TIME THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE CLEAR PREFERENCE OF ISRAEL'S INTERESTS AND POLICY.

2. EBAN BEGAN BY STATING THAT NO GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD TOOK SERIOUSLY ANY VIEW OTHER THAN THAT EGYPT AND SYRIA AND INITIATED CURRENT HOSTILITIES. ARAB ATTACK ADMITTEDLY CAUGHT ISRAEL BY SURPRISE, RESULTING IN EARLY LOSS OF GROUND. IN ADDITION TO ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, INITIAL ARAB SUCCESSES WERE DUE TO LAVISHNESS WITH WHICH SOVS HAD PROVIDED MILITARY SUPPLIES. NEVERTHELESS, BY ANY CRITERION OTHER THAN THAT OF 1967 WAR, ISRAEL'S PRESENT MILITARY POSITION COULD ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS "VICTORIOUS."

3. EBAN SAID TIDE HAD TURNED RADICALLY IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR SINCE LAST WEEKEND. ARAB ATTACK HAD BEEN HALTED AS RESULT OF TWO THINGS: FIRST, ISRAELI MOBILIZATION AND REACHED ITS PEAK; AND, SECOND, CONCERN ABOUT MILITARY RESUPPLY HAD DISAPPEARED. EBAN REMARKED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS IMPRESSED WITH "EXTRAORDINARY ZEAL...AND TOTALLY UNEXPECTED SPEED" WITH WHICH RESUPPLY WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED.

4. EBAN WENT ON TO DISCUSS PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL WAS READY TO EXAMINE CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL, EITHER FOR CESSION OF HOSTILITIES IN PLACE OR ALONG OCT 5 LINES. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT CEASEFIRE WOULD BE POSSIBLE WHEN ALL PARTIES WERE READY, NOT SIMPLY WHEN SOMEONE DRAFTED A RES. HE THOUGHT SYRIA WAS NOW PSYCHOLOGICALLY READY TO ACCEPT CEASEFIRE, BUT SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THAT SAME WAS TRUE OF EGYPT. EGYPT WAS "LIVING IN A EUPHORIA THAT GOES BEYOND THE REALITIES OF ITS MILITARY POSITION." DANGER EXISTS THAT EGYPT WILL PASS FROM ITS PREVIOUS FRUSTRATION TO EXCESSIVE JUBILATION, BYPASSING INTERMEDIATE STAGE OF PERCEPTION OF REALISTIC POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES.

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5. EBAN SAID THERE WAS TIME WHEN SOVS SEEMED INTERESTED IN SIMPLY CEASEFIRE, BUT THAT APPEARED TO HAVE PASSED. USSK WAS (NOT) NOW IN MOOD TO CONCERT ACTION IN SEARCH FOR PEACE. THIS WAS EITHER BECAUSE SOVS BELIEVED THEY COULD NOT INFLUENCE EGYPT OR BECAUSE THEY FOUND PRESENT SITUATION TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.

6. AS FOR FUTURE, EBAN SAID, ISRAEL HAD NO INTENTION TO SURRENDER ITS FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL POSITION. ITS FIRST OBJECTIVE WAS A CEASEFIRE, ITS NEXT OBJECTIVE A NEGOTIATED PEACE. WITH REGARD TO LATTER, ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT SC RES 242 IN ITS PRECISE TERMS. IT WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, BUT NOT TO "TOTAL, IMMEDIATE OR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL", NONE OF WHICH TERMS WERE CONTAINED IN RES 242. WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES WAS OUT OF QUESTION AS PRESENT CONFLICT HAD DEMONSTRATED, THIS WOULD MEAN WITHDRAWAL TO POSITION OF SUICIDE. ONE THING ISRAEL HAD LEARNED IN LAST TWO WEEKS WAS GREATER RESPECT FOR ARAB CAPACITY TO LAUNCH SURPRISE ATTACK. TO VIRTUALLY EVERY ISRAELI, LESSON IS THAT NEED FOR SECURE BOUNDARIES IS NOW GREATER THAN EVER.

7. EBAN SAID THAT IF CEASEFIRE RES WERE INTRODUCED CONTAINING ANY REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL TO JUNE 1967 LINES, IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL AND "WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT BE ADOPTED BY COUNCIL." AT SAME TIME, IF RES CONTAINED NO SUCH REFERENCE, IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO ARABS. THUS, ONLY REALISTIC POSSIBILITY--AND THAT, EBAN RE-EMPHASIZED, IS NOT IMMEDIATE PROSPECT--IS SIMPLY CEASEFIRE RES. CEASEFIRE MIGHT BE DESCRIBED IN RES AS "FIRST STEP" TOWARD PERMANENT SETTLEMENT, BUT NO ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO COMBINE IN ONE PACKAGE ELEMENTS OF FINAL SETTLEMENT AND CEASEFIRE ITSELF.

8. EBAN DESCRIBED SADAT'S OCTOBER 16 STATEMENT AS HARDENING OF EGYPTIAN POSITION. ONE REASON WAS THAT ALLUSION TO RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WAS, IN EBAN'S VIEW, TANTAMOUNT TO ANNIHILATION OF ISRAEL SINCE SADAT HAD MADE IT CLEAR HE CONSIDERED PLO LEGITIMATE REPS OF PALESTINIANS.

9. EBAN CONCLUDED BY ASKING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE FOLLOWING POSITIONS:

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- A) AGREE THAT ONLY LASTING SETTLEMENT IS A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, AND ONLY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS CAN ARABS OBTAIN FROM ISRAEL WHAT THEY WANT!
- B) RECOGNIZE THAT CURRENT HOSTILITIES CONSTITUTE BATTLE FOR ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL!
- C) ADVOCATE A WAITING POLICY UNTIL POSSIBILITY EMERGES FOR CEASEFIRE.

BENNETT

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SECRET 604

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45  
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODF-00 1031 W  
171524Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8112

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 15038

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: GW, US, IS, MASS  
SUBJECT: PROPOSED FRG PRESS LINE ON US RESUPPLY OF  
ISRAEL

REF: BONN 15020

1. DURING EMBOFF'S OCTOBER 17 FOLLOW-UP TO AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON FONMIN SCHEEL (RFFTEL), FRG FONOFF (NATO CHIEF (WHO HAD SAT IN ON HILLENRAND-SCHEEL MEETING) RAISED QUESTION OF PRESS HANDLING. HE SAID THIS ISSUE WAS BOUND TO ARISE IN NEXT DAY OR SO, AND HE THOUGHT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN SHOULD HAVE A LINE WORKED OUT THAT WOULD ACCORD WITH US VIEWS. FOLLOWING IS THE GENERAL LINE THE FONOFF PROPOSED:

A. POSSIBLE QUESTION: IS THE US RESUPPLYING ISRAEL FROM US MATERIAL LOCATED IN THE FRG?

PROPOSED ANSWER: THE US IS RESUPPLYING ISRAEL FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES. A LIMITED AMOUNT OF THE MATERIAL BEING USED FOR THIS RESUPPLYING OPERATION IS COMING FROM US DEPOTS IN THE FRG.

B. POSSIBLE QUESTION: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE MATERIAL BEING TRANSFERRED FROM GERMANY?

PROPOSED ANSWER: NO COMMENT. THIS QUESTION

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
REINHOLD \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHNEIDER \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

D/B

(S)



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SECRET

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SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE US AUTHORITIES.

C. POSSIBLE QUESTION: DO AIRCRAFT CONSTITUTE PART  
OF THE MATERIAL BEING TRANSFERRED?

PROPOSED ANSWER: SAME AS TO PRECED-  
ING QUESTION. (FYI: FONOFF IS CONCERNED, APPARENTLY  
BY PRESS REPORTS AND ARAB AMBASSADORS' QUERIES, THAT  
IMPRESSION IS WIDESPREAD IN SOME CIRCLES IN BONN THAT  
US AIRCRAFT ARE BEING MOVED FROM FRG TO ISRAEL. WE  
ARGUED THAT NO COMMENT RESPONSE IS STILL ONLY ONE THAT  
MAKES SENSE FOR ONCE WE GET INTO CONFIRMING OR DENYING  
WHAT HAS OR HAS NOT BEEN MOVED, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE  
TO PRESERVE SECRECY. END FYI.)

D. POSSIBLE QUESTION: WAS THIS US RESUPPLY OPERA-  
TION FROM DEPOTS IN GERMANY CARRIED OUT WITH THE CON-  
SENT (OR CO-OPERATION OR KNOWLEDGE) OF THE FEDERAL  
GOVERNMENT.

PROPOSED ANSWER: THE US GOVERNMENT INFORMED  
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF ITS ACTIONS IN THIS REGARD.

E. POSSIBLE QUESTION: IS THIS MATERIAL BEING  
REMOVED FROM THE FRG TO BE REPLACED?

PROPOSED ANSWER: WE ASSUME IT WILL BE

NOTE BY DC/T: LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED; EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR.  
WRIGHT, S/S-0, 10/17/73.

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SECRET 609

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 1031 W  
----- 129541

O 171524Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8113

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 15038  
EXDIS

REPLACED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (FYI: FONOFF CLEARLY  
WANTS TO BE ABLE TO TELL SCHEEL AS WELL AS PRESS THAT  
TRANSFER OF MATERIAL IS A TEMPORARY MATTER AND THAT  
ITS REPLACEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE SOON. WE WOULD  
APPRECIATE ANYTHING DEPARTMENT CAN GIVE US TO ASSURE  
GERMANS ON THIS POINT. END FYI.)

F. POSSIBLE QUESTION: ARE ANY US TROOPS IN  
GERMANY BEING MOVED FROM GERMANY, OR ARE THEY ON AN  
ALERT STATUS AS A RESULT OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR?

PROPOSED ANSWER: NO COMMENT. THIS QUESTION  
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE US AUTHORITIES. I MAY ADD  
BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD  
THAT NO US TROOPS HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM GERMANY OR NO  
US TROOPS PLACED ON ALERT IN GERMANY AS A RESULT OF THE  
WAR.

2. EMBOFF STRESSED TO FONOFF REP THAT THE LESS SAID  
TO THE PRESS THE BETTER, AND THAT ANY FRG STATEMENTS  
SHOULD COME ONLY IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS.  
EMBOFF SAID HE STRONGLY FAVORED, SUBJECT TO DEPART-  
MENT'S VIEWS, THAT FEDREP SPOKESMEN NOT GO BEYOND  
ANYTHING LAID DOWN IN PARA 1 ABOVE.

3. FONOFF REP ASKED WHETHER, IN US VIEW, FEDERAL  
GOVERNMENT SHOULD GO MUCH BEYOND PROPOSED PRESS LINE  
IN ANSWERING ARAB AMBASSADORS' QUERIES. EMBOFF SAID  
PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT NOT, BUT ADDED THAT FONMIN  
SCHEEL'S SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE ARABS (PARA 7,

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BONN 150071 WOULD, IF USED, SET THE RIGHT TONE.

4. FONOFF REP SAID FONOFF WOULD APPRECIATE US VIEWS ON THE PRESS CUM ARAB HANDLING LINES ASAP, SINCE PRESURES FROM BOTH WOULD CERTAINLY INCREASE IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO. HE SAID HE HAD HELD FONOFF PRESS SPOKESMEN OFF FROM SAYING ANYTHING ON SUBJECT OF FRG ROL IN RESUPPLY AT OCTOBER 17 AFTERNOON PRESS CONFERENCE.

5. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON ABOVE.  
HILLENBRAND

NOTE BY OC/T: LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED; EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. WRIGHT, S/S-O, 10/17/73.



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PAGE #1 STATE 205333

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ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-73 ISO-00 NEA-10 AF-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03  
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03  
SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 SAJ-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
USSS-00 INRE-00 MC-02 NTC-01 /160 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/EE EHURWITZ:DK  
APPROVED BY EUR/EE JABAKER  
S/PRS - MISS POULAIN (SUBS)  
EUR/P - MR. GEHRON (SUBS)  
MEPF - MR. STACKHOUSE

----- 122664

P 170004Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 205333

E.O. 11652:N/A  
TAGS: PFOR, BU  
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REPORT OF US PARTICIPATION IN MIDDLE EAST  
WAR  
REF: SOFIA 1383

1. DEPARTMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE ANY EMBASSY ACTION  
NECESSARY AS RESULT SPECIFICALLY OF SYRIAN REPORT TO  
GOB THAT US AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATING IN ATTACKS IN MIDDLE  
EAST. ACCURATE BULGARIAN PRESS REPORTING OF AMBASSADOR  
MCCLOSKEY'S OCTOBER 13 DENIAL OF SUCH CHARGES INDICATES  
GOB AWARENESS OF OUR POSITION AND SOME EFFORT AT EVEN-  
HANDED PRESS TREATMENT OF ISSUE.

2. AT EMBASSY'S DISCRETION, AND WITHOUT MAKING SPECIAL  
CALL, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO LET BULGARIAN OFFICIALS KNOW  
THAT WE ARE OBSERVING CLOSELY THEIR PRESS HANDLING OF X

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MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND ARE PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS THAT  
NO PUBLICITY BE GIVEN TO UNFOUNDED STORIES DESIGNED TO  
EXACERBATE SITUATION. WHILE SIMULTANEOUS PUBLICATION OF  
US DENIAL OF SYRIAN CLAIM WAS TIMELY, AVOIDANCE OF  
INITIAL CHARGE WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE. KISSINGER

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